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ABSTRACT
This dissertation covers the two major parts of my Ph.D. research: i) developing a the-
oretical framework of complex networks; and ii) applying statistical physics concepts and
methods to quantitatively analyze complex systems.
In part I, we focus on developing theories of interdependent networks, which includes
two chapters: 1) We develop a mathematical framework to study the percolation of interde-
pendent networks under targeted attack and find that when the highly-connected nodes are
protected and have lower probability to fail, in contrast to single scale-free (SF) networks
where the percolation threshold pc = 0, coupled SF networks are significantly more vulner-
able, with pc significantly larger than zero. 2) We analytically demonstrate that clustering,
which quantifies the propensity for two neighbors of the same vertex to also be neighbors
of each other, significantly increases the vulnerability of the system.
In part II, we apply concepts and methods developed in statistical physics to study eco-
nomic systems, which also includes two chapters: 1) Centrality measures are widely studied
in statistical physics to describe the importance of certain nodes in complex systems. We
apply centrality measure concepts to study the influence of directors in the US corporate
governance network, in which nodes represent directors and links between two directors
represent their service on common company boards. 2) Using concepts of percolation and
vi
cascading failure, we study the robustness of the interconnected banking system as a com-
plex network. With empirical banks’ balance sheet data in 2007 as input to the model, we
find that our bipartite network model efficiently identifies a significant portion of the actual
failed banks during the financial crisis between 2008 and 2011. The results suggest that
complex network models could be useful for systemic risk stress testing of banking systems.
We also find first-order-like phase transition in the banking system, which means that the
banking system can experience an abrupt collapse under certain circumstances.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Random Networks and Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Generating Function Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Interdependent Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Robustness of Interdependent Networks Under Targeted Attack 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Targeted Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Interdependent Networks Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Mapping Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 The Robustness Of Interdependent Clustered Networks 23
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Site Percolation of Single Clustered Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Degree-Degree Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Percolation on Interdependent Clustered Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Conclusion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Identifying Influential Directors in the United States Corporate Gover-
nance Network 36
viii
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3 Directors’ Network and Its Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Influence Factor Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5 Properties Of The Influence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.6 Empirical Tests of Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6.1 Test: Power and influence of female directors in the US corporate
governance network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6.2 Test: Power and influence of directors in the US corporate governance
network for specific industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5 Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Prop-
agation 57
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Properties of Failed Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3 Cascading Failure Propagation Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4 Empirical Test and Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.6 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6 Conclusion 76
Bibliography 79
Curriculum Vitae 91
ix
List of Tables
5.1 Description of Commercial Banks - Balance Sheet Data (CBBSD) fromWhar-
ton Research Data Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
x
List of Figures
1.1 Illustration of cascading failure in interdependent networks. . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 (a) Dependence of pc on α for SF single and interdependent networks with
average degree 〈k〉 = 4. (b) Values of pc vs α for SF interdependent networks
with different λ and lower cut-off m = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Values of p∞ vs p when both networks are initially attacked. . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Size of giant component g(p) in single networks with degree distribution
Eq. (3.7) and average degree 〈k〉 = 4, as a function of p, the fraction of
remaining nodes after random removal of nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Degree-degrees correlation as a function of the clustering coefficient. . . . . 30
3.3 (a) Size of mutually connected giant component as a function of cascading
failure steps n. (b) Size of giant component, p∞, in interdependent networks
as a function of p. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 (a) Size of giant component as a function of p for fixed clustering coefficient.
(b) Critical threshold pc as a function of average degree for different clustering
coefficients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1 Illustration of a subnetwork of the company-director bipartite network. . . . 37
4.2 Illustration of a bipartite network and its “one-mode” projection. . . . . . . 50
4.3 Cumulative degree distribution of the network of directors. . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Illustration of the distance between directors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
xi
4.5 Demonstration of cumulative distribution of director’s influence factor I and
NIF I˜ in different years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.6 Percentage of overlap of top directors according to influence factor between
different realizaitons v.s. years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.7 Comparison between the influence factor I, TCC and the existing centrality
measures for a typical year 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.8 Comparison between the efficiency ǫ of the influence factor measure and other
measures in identifying the most influential directors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1 Bank-asset bipartite network model with banks as one node type and assets
as the other node type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2 Comparison of probability density functions (PDF) of weight of typical assets
and equity ratios between all banks and FDIC listed failed banks for 2007. . 61
5.3 Fraction of survived banks after cascading failures as function of the initial
loss of value of certain asset, with η = 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4 ROC curves of the prediction of failed banks by our cascading failure model
when the loans for construction and land development are initially shocked
(top figures) and when the loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties
are initially shocked (bottom figures). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.5 ROC curves of predictions of failed banks by our cascading failure model
when (a) loans secured by 1-4 family resid. properties and (b) agricultural
loans are initially shocked respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.6 Survival rate of banks when asset 0 ( loans for construction and land devel-
opment ) is initially shocked as function of one parameter with the other two
parameters fixed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.7 Phase diagram for parameter α and p, when η = 0.26. . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
xii
List of Abbreviations
CBBSD Commercial Banks-Balance Sheet Data
CDF Cumulative probability Distribution Function
ER Erdo¨s Re´nyi
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDL Failed Bank List
IRRC Investor Responsibility Research Center
NIF Normalized Influence Factor
NOI Number Of Iterations
PDF Probability Distribution Function
ROC curve Receiver Operating Characteristic curve
SF Scale-Free
TCC Total Capitalization of all the Companies
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Networks are present in almost every aspect of our life, i.e. communication networks of
telephones and cellular phones, the electrical power grid, computer communication networks
in technological world; the network of friendship between individuals, working relations or
common hobbies, and the network of business relations between persons and firms in the
social and economic world.
This dissertation develops theoretical framework of complex networksand applies com-
plex networks models to quantitatively analyze economics systems. This thesis is separated
into two major parts: i) theoretical development of complex networks models, ii) application
of complex networks models.
In part I, we focus on developing theories of interdependent networks. Due to tech-
nological progress, modern systems are becoming more and more mutually coupled and
depend on each other to provide proper functionality [1–3]. For example, a power station
network and a communication network are coupled, since nodes rely for power supply on
the power stations, while the power stations depend for their control on the communication
nodes [4]. While in the past the study of single networks has been dominant in the net-
works field, the question of robustness of interdependent networks has recently become of
large interest [5–8]. In interdependent networks, nodes from one network depend on nodes
from another network and vice versa. Consequently, when nodes from one network fail they
cause nodes in the other network to fail too. When some initial failure of nodes happens,
1
2this may trigger a recursive process of cascading failures that can completely fragment both
networks. This part includes two chapters: 1) We develop a mathematical framework to
study the percolation of interdependent networks under targeted-attack and find that when
the highly connected nodes are protected and have lower probability to fail, in contrast to
single scale-free (SF) networks where the percolation threshold pc = 0, coupled SF networks
are significantly more vulnerable with pc significantly larger than zero. 2) We analytically
demonstrates that clustering, which quantifies the propensity for two neighbours of the
same vertex to also be neighbours of each other, significantly increases the vulnerability of
the system.
In part II, we apply the complex network models to study economic systems. In the
wake of the recent global financial crisis, increased attention has been given to the study
of the dynamics of economic systems and to systemic risk in particular. The widespread
impact of the current EU sovereign debt crisis and the 2008 world financial crisis show
that as economic systems become increasingly interconnected, local exogenous or endoge-
nous shocks can provoke global cascading system failure that is difficult to reverse and that
cripples the system for a prolonged period of time. Thus policy makers are compelled to
create and implement safety measures that can prevent cascading system failures or soften
their systemic impact. Based on the success of complex networks in modelling intercon-
nected systems, applying complex network theory to study economical systems has been
under the spot light [9–14]. This part includes two chapters: 1) We study the US corporate
governance network, in which nodes representing directors and links between two directors
representing their service on common company boards, and proposed a quantitative influ-
ence measure to identify the most influential directors in the network. 2) We propose a
bipartite networks model to simulate the risk propagation process during financial crisis.
With empirical bank’s balance sheet data in 2007 as input to the model, we find that our
model efficiently identifies a significant portion of the actual failed banks reported by Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation during the financial crisis between 2008 and 2011. The
results suggest that this model could be useful for systemic risk stress testing for financial
3systems. The model also identifies that commercial rather than residential real estate assets
are major culprits for the failure of over 350 US commercial banks during 2008 - 2011.
The rest of this introduction will first present some basic definitions of complex networks
and its properties. Then we introduce the generating function method which is extensively
used in this thesis for deriving percolation properties of networks. At last, we will introduce
the framework and some developments in interdependent networks research.
1.1 Random Networks and Properties
The mathematical concepts describing networks are graphs. Graphs represent the essential
topological properties of a network by treating the network as a collection of nodes and links
among nodes. The number of links that a node is attached is defined as the degree of this
node. Before 1960 the work on graph theory has mainly dealt with the properties of special
individual graphs. In the 1960s, Paul Erdo˝s and Alfred Re´nyi initiated a systematic study
of random graphs [15–17]. Random graph theory is, in fact, not the study of individual
graphs, but the study of a statistical ensemble of graphs. A property is said to exist for a
class of graphs is the fraction of graphs not having it in the ensemble is of zero measure.
An interesting characteristic of the ensemble is that many of its properties have a related
threshold pc(N), such that the property exists, in the thermodynamic limit of N →∞, with
probability 0 if p < pc, and with probability 1 if p > pc. This phenomenon is the same as
the physical concept of a percolation phase transition. For example, the giant component
of a network, i.e. a set of connected nodes, is such a property.
Two types of random graphs are mostly widely studied: Erdo˝s Re´nyi networks (ER
networks) and scale-free (SF networks) networks. The Erdo˝s Re´nyi networks are firstly
studied by Paul Erdo˝s and Alfred Re´nyi in 1960s. It has been traditionally the dominant
subject of study in the field of random graphs. A well-known result for the ER networks is
that the degree distribution is Poissonian,
P (k) = e−zzk/k!, (1.1)
4where z = 〈k〉 is the average degree. The critical threshold for a giant component to exist
in ER networks is 〈k〉 > 1. If 〈k〉 < 1 only small components exist, and size of the largest
component is proportional to logN [16]. Direct measurement of the degree distribution for
real networks, such as the Internet [18, 19], WWW [20], e-mail networks [21], citations of
scientific articles [22], metabolic networks [23], airline networks [24], neuronal networks [25]
and many more, show that Poisson distribution does not apply. Instead, these networks
exhibit a power-law degree distribution,
P (k) = ck−γ , k = m, ...,K, (1.2)
where c ≈ (γ − 1)mγ−1 is a normalization factor, and m and K are the lower and upper
cutoffs for the degree of a node. The divergence of moments higher than (γ−1) is responsible
for many of the anomalous properties attributed to scale-free networks.
Degree distribution alone is not enough to characterize the network. There are other
quantities, such as the closeness (average distance between each pair of nodes), degree-degree
correlation (between connected nodes), betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient.
Since these properties are studied in this thesis, here we introduce the brief definition of
these properties of networks.
Distance
In a network, distance between two nodes is defined as the length of the shortest path
between these two nodes. To find the distance from a origin node to all the other nodes, we
just need to build a minimum spanning tree from the network. The distance from a node
to the origin node is the number of steps spanning the tree when this node is reached.
Degree-degree correlation
Degree-degree correlation is defined as the degree correlation of all pairs of linked nodes,
ρD =
∑
all links(kl − 〈k〉)(kr − 〈k〉)
σ2k
, (1.3)
5where kl and kr are the degree of nodes at the two ends of a link, 〈k〉 is the average degree
of nodes in the network and σk is the standard deviation of degrees of nodes. When degree-
degree correlation is larger than zero, that means high (low) degree nodes tend to connect
with high (low) degree nodes. This case is called assortative. Otherwise, the system is
disassortative.
Betweenness centrality
Betweenness is a centrality measure of a vertex within a graph. Betweenness centrality
quantifies the number of times a node is on the shortest path between two other nodes.
The betweenness of a vertex i is dened to be the fraction of shortest paths between pairs
of vertices in a network that pass through i. If, as is frequently the case, there is more
than one shortest path between a given pair of vertices, then each such path is given equal
weight such that the weights sum to unity. To be precise, suppose that gi(st) is the number
of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t that pass through i, and suppose that nst is the
total number of geodesic paths from s to t. Then the betweenness of vertex i is [26],
bi =
∑
s<t g
st
i
n(n− 1)/2
, (1.4)
where n is the total number of nodes in the network. Betweenness centrality can be regarded
as a measure of the extent to which a node has control over information owing between
others.
Clustering
Clustering quantifies the propensity for two neighbours of the same vertex to also be neigh-
bors of each other, forming triangle-shaped configurations in the network [27–29]. The
clustering is high if two nodes sharing a neighbor have a high probability to be connected
to each other. There are two common definitions of clustering. The first is global,
c =
3× (number of triangles in network)
number of connected triples
, (1.5)
6where a “connected triple” means a single vertex with edges running to an unordered pair
of other vertices. A second definition of clustering is based on the average of the clustering
for single nodes. The clustering for a single node is the fraction of pairs of linked negihbors
out of the total number of pairs of neighbors,
ci =
number of triangles connected to vertex i
numberoftriplescenteredonvertexi
. (1.6)
Then the clustering coefficient for the whole network is the average of ci.
Bonacich power centrality
Bonacich argued that a node’s centrality in a network should depend on three criteria:1)
the number of links to other nodes; 2) the intensity of the link; and 3) the centrality of
those with whom one is linked. If we have the adjacent matrix M for a network, then the
Bonacich centrality for a node i is defined as [30]
Bi =
1
λ
N∑
j=1
MijBj , (1.7)
where N is the size of the network, λ is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix M .
Later, Bonacich interpret the power centrality [31] in another way, in terms of random
walks that have a xed probability of dying per step. The power centrality of vertex i is the
expected number of times such a walk passes through i, averaged over all possible starting
points for the walk.
1.2 Generating Function Method
Generating function method is very powerful and commonly used to describe random graphs
with arbitrary degree distributions. Newman Strogatz and Watts comprehensively intro-
duced this technique in ref. [32]. Here we introduce the results that we can use. Suppose
that we have a unipartite undirected graph of N vertices, with N large. We dene the
7generating function of G0(x) for the probability distribution of node degree k as
G0x =
∞∑
k=0
P (k)xk, (1.8)
where P (k) is the probability that a randomly chosen node on the graph has degree k. The
probability P (k) is given by the kth derivative of G0 according to
pk =
1
k!
dkG0
dxk
|x=0. (1.9)
Thus the generating function encapsulates all the information contained in the discrete
probability distribution P (k).
If the distribution of a property k of an object is generated by a given generating
function, then the distribution of the total of k summed over m independent realizations
of the object is generated by the mth power of that generating function. As an example,
considering the generating function of the total degree of two nodes:
[G0x]
2 =
[∑
k
P (k)xk
]
=
∑
jk
P (k)P (j)xj+k
= P (0)P (0)x0 + (P (0)P (1) + P (1)P (0)) x1
+ (P (0)P (2) + P (1)P (1) + P (2)P (0)) x2
+ (P (0)P (3) + P (1)P (2) + P (2)P (1) + P (3)P (0)) x3 + ...
(1.10)
It is easy to see that the coefficient of the power of xn in this expression is precisely the sum
of all products P (i)P (k) such that j+ k = n, which correctly gives the probability that the
sum of the degrees of the two vertices will be n.
If we start at a randomly chosen node and follow each of the edges at that vertex to reach
the k nearest neighbors, then the nodes arrived at each have the distribution of remaining
outgoing edges generated by G1(x). The generating function is
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
=
1
〈k〉
G′0(x), (1.11)
8where 〈k〉 is the average node degree.
When a giant component exists in a network, the generating function formalism still
works. And the size of the giant component (S), which is the fraction of the graph occupied
by the giant component, can be found by
S = 1−G0(u),
u = G1(u).
(1.12)
And the phase transition, when the giant component in a network first to emerge, is at the
point
G′1(1) = 1. (1.13)
1.3 Interdependent Networks
Before 2010, after many years of intense study on networks, almost all work done has
concentrated on the limited case of a single network which does not interact with other net-
works. Such situations rarely, if ever, occur in nature. Just as in the case of idealized gas,
when interactions are present as in nature, new physical laws appear. In 2010, Buldyrev
and etc. [7] firstly proposed a mathematical framework to study the robustness of interde-
pendent networks. This mathematical framework is the basis of the theoretical research on
interdependent networks in this thesis.
The interdependent networks model consists of two networks A and B, and assume
that the functioning of a node in network A depends on the ability of one or more nodes in
network B to supply a critical resource to the node in network A. Similarly, a node in network
B depends on a set of nodes in network A. The networks can be connected in different ways;
in the most general configuration one could specify the distributions of connections between
the nodes from both networks. The networks can have the same, or different, typologies.
The model can easily be extended to an arbitrary number of interacting networks each
with its own specific topology and dependence on the other networks. For example, an
interesting dependence for three interacting networks could be a circular dependency in
9which the nodes in network B depend on network A for a resource, the nodes of network
C depend on the nodes of network B for a resource and the nodes of network A depend on
network C for resources.
The giant component and critical threshold of interdependent networks can be solved
analytically using the apparatus of generating functions. We assume the nodes in two
interdependent networks are one to one correspondent. If one node fails, the corresponding
node fails. The generating functions of degree distribution of networks A and B are defined
as
GA0(x) =
∑
k
PA(k)x
k
GB0(x) =
∑
k
PB(k)x
k.
(1.14)
The generating functions of the underlining branching process, Eq.1.11, are
GA1(x) = G
′
A0(x)/G
′
A0(1),
GB1(x) = G
′
B0(x)/G
′
B0(1).
(1.15)
Random removal of fraction 1 − p of nodes will change the degree distribution of the re-
maining nodes [33]
GA0(x, p) = GA0(1− p(1− x)),
GB0(x, p) = GB0(1− p(1− x)),
GA1(x, p) = GA1(1− p(1− x)),
GB1(x, p) = GB1(1− p(1− x)).
(1.16)
According to Eq. 1.12, the giant component of the network A after removing 1− p fraction
of nodes is
pA(p) = 1−GA0(fA, p), (1.17)
where fA satisfies equation
fA(p) = GA1(fA, p). (1.18)
10
Next, we present the formalism for the cascade process step by step, as shown in fig. 1.1.
On the first step, after the initial attach which removes (1 − p) fraction of nodes (the red
part in network A in fig. 1.1) from networks A, the remaining network is named A0, with
a size of ψ′1 = p fraction of the network A, number of nodes N0 = pN . The orange part
in fig.1.1 are the fraction of nodes detached from the giant component after the red part
is removed. The giant component of the remaining network is thus of size ψ1 = ψ
′
1pA(ψ
′
1),
number of nodes is N1 = N0pA(ψ
′
1). In the second stage of the cascading failure, the failed
node in network A cause their corresponding nodes in network B to fail. Thus (1 − ψ1)
fraction of nodes in network B fail, which cause the green part disconnected from the giant
component. The remaining fraction of network B is φ′1 = ψ1, and the fraction of nodes
in the giant component of network B is φ1 = φ
′
1pB(φ
′
1), number of nodes N2 = N1pB(φ
′
1).
In the third step of the cascading failure, the nodes in the giant component of network A
corresponding to the green part in network B is removed. The removal of these nodes from
ψ1 causes the purple part in network A to be disconnected from the giant component, which
leaves a giant component size of ψ2. That is equivalent to the removal of the same fraction
of nodes from A0. To achieve the same giant component size ψ2, the total number of nodes
that must be removed from network A is (1 − pB(ψ1))N0 nodes from A0 plus the number
of the initially attacked nodes (1 − p)N (green and red part in the right bottom figure in
fig. 1.1), which causes the blue part to be detached from the giant component. Thus, the
total number of nodes that must be removed from network A is (1−ppB(ψ1))N . Hence the
third-stage failure is equivalent to a random attack in which p is replaced by φ′1 = ppB(ψ1).
The following steps repeats the above procedure.
Following this approach, we can construct the sequence of giant components of networks,
ψ′1 = p, ψ1 = ψ
′
1pA(ψ
′
1), (1.19)
φ′1 = ppA(ψ
′
1), φ1 = φ
′
1pB(φ
′
1), (1.20)
ψ′2 = ppB(φ
′
1), ψ2 = ψ
′
2pA(ψ
′
2), ... (1.21)
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of cascading failure in interdependent networks.
At the end of the cascade process, ψ′n = ψ
′
n+1, φ
′
n = φ
′
n+1. Thus we arrive to a system of
x = ppA(y), y = ppB(x), (1.22)
which also gives equation
x = ppA(ppB(x)). (1.23)
This equation can be solved graphically. After we find x, the size of the mutually con-
nected giant component of the interdependent networks can be found by S = xpB(x).
The critical condition when the giant component of the interdependent networks exists is
1 = p2p′A(ppB(x))p
′
A(x), where p
′
A(x) is the derivative of function pA(x).
Chapter 2
Robustness of Interdependent Networks
Under Targeted Attack
2.1 Introduction
Modern systems due to technological progress are becoming more and more mutually cou-
pled and depend on each other to provide proper functionality [2–4]. For example, blackouts
are usually caused by cascading failures between the power grid and its communication sup-
port system [4]. While cascade of failures in one network, e.g., overload failure, can cause
dramatic damage to a system [34, 35], social disruptions caused by recent disasters, ranging
from hurricanes to large-scale power outages and terrorist attacks, have shown that the
most dangerous vulnerability is hiding in the many interdependencies across different net-
works [1, 36]. The question of robustness of interdependent networks has recently become
of interest [5–8]. In interdependent networks, nodes from one network depend on nodes
from another network and vice versa. Consequently, when nodes from one network fail they
cause nodes in the other network to fail, too. When some initial failure of nodes happens,
this may trigger a recursive process of cascading failures that can completely fragment both
networks.
Recently, a theoretical framework was developed [7] to study the process of cascading
failures in interdependent network caused by random initial failure of nodes. They show that
due to the coupling between networks, interdependent networks are extremely vulnerable
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to random failure. However, when we consider real scenarios, initial failure is mostly not
random. It may be due to a targeted attack on important central nodes. It can also
occur to low central nodes because important central nodes are purposely defended, e.g.
in internet networks, heavily connected hubs are purposely more secured. Indeed, it was
shown that targeted attacks on high degree nodes [37–41] or high betweenness nodes [42, 43]
in single networks have dramatic effect on their robustness. The question of robustness of
interdependent networks under targeted attack or defence has not been addressed.
2.2 Targeted Attack Model
In this chapter, we develop a mathematical framework for understanding the robustness of
interdependent networks under initial targeted attack which depends on degree of nodes.
The framework is based on a general technique we develop to solve targeted attack problems
in networks by mapping them to random attack problems. A value Wα(ki) is assigned to
each node, which represents the probability that a node i with ki links is initially attacked
and become inactive. We focus on the family of functions [40]
Wα(ki) =
kαi∑N
i=1 k
α
i
,−∞ < α < +∞. (2.1)
When α > 0, nodes with higher degree are more vulnerable and those nodes are intention-
ally attacked, while for α < 0, nodes with higher degree are defended and so have lower
probability to fail. The case α = 0, W0 =
1
N , represents the random removal of nodes [7]
and the case α → ∞ represents the targeted attack case where nodes are removed strictly
in the order from high degree to low degree. For the α < 0 case, nodes with zero degree
should be removed before analysis begins. An important special case α = 1 corresponds to
the acquaintance immunization strategy [44].
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2.3 Interdependent Networks Model
Our model consists of two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes, N . The
N nodes in each network are connected to nodes in the other network by bidirectional
dependency links, thereby establishing a one-to-one correspondence. The functioning of a
A-node in network A depends on the functioning of the corresponding B-node in network
B and vice versa. Within each network, the nodes are randomly connected with degree
distributions PA(k) and PB(k) respectively. We begin by studying the situation where only
network A is attacked. We initially remove a fraction, 1 − p, of the A-nodes of network
A with probability Wα(ki) (Eq.(2.1)) and remove all the A-links that connect to those
removed nodes. As nodes and links are sequentially removed, network A begins to fragment
into connected components. Nodes that are not connected to the giant component are
considered inactive and are removed. Owing to the dependence between the networks, all
the B-nodes in network B that are connected to the removed A-nodes in network A are then
also removed. Network B also begins to fragment into connected components and only the
nodes in the giant component are kept. Then network B spreads damage back to network
A. The damage is spreaded between network A and B, back and forth until they completely
fragment or arrive to a mutually connected component and no further removal of nodes and
links occurs.
2.4 Mapping Method
The main idea of our approach is to find an equivalent network A′, such that the targeted
attack problem on interdependent networks A and B can be solved as a random attack
problem on interdependent networks A′ and B. We start by finding the new degree dis-
tribution of network A after removing, according to Eq.(2.1), 1 − p fraction of nodes but
before the links of the remaining nodes which connect to the removed nodes are removed.
Let Ap(k) be the number of nodes with degree k and Pp(k) be the new degree distribution
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of the remaining fraction p of nodes in network A,
Pp(k) =
Ap(k)
pN
. (2.2)
When another node is removed, Ap(k) changes as
A(p−1/N)(k) = Ap(k)−
Pp(k)k
α
〈k(p)α〉
, (2.3)
where 〈k(p)α〉 ≡
∑
Pp(k)k
α. In the limit of N →∞, Eq.(2.3) can be presented in terms of
derivative of Ap(k) with respect to p,
dAp(k)
dp
= N
Pp(k)k
α
〈k(p)α〉
. (2.4)
Differentiating Eq.(2.2) with respect to p and using Eq.(2.4), we obtain
−p
dPp(k)
dp
= Pp(k)−
Pp(k)k
α
〈k(p)α〉
, (2.5)
which is exact for N → ∞. In order to solve Eq.(2.5), we define a function Gα(x) ≡∑
k P (k)x
kα , and substitue f ≡ G−1α (p). We find by direct differentiation that [45]
Pp(k) = P (k)
fk
α
Gα(f)
=
1
p
P (k)fk
α
, (2.6)
〈k(p)α〉 =
fG′α(f)
Gα(f)
, (2.7)
satisfy the Eq.(2.5). With this degree distribution, the generating function of the nodes left
in network A before removing the links to the removed nodes is
GAb(x) ≡
∑
k
Pp(k)x
k =
1
p
∑
k
P (k)fk
α
xk. (2.8)
Because network A is randomly connected, the probability of a link emanating from a
remaining node is equal to the ratio of the number of links emanating from the remaining
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nodes to the total number of links emanating from all the nodes of the original network:
p˜ ≡
pN 〈k(p)〉
N 〈k〉
=
∑
k P (k)kf
kα∑
k P (k)k
, (2.9)
where 〈k〉 is the average degree of the original network A, 〈k(p)〉 is the average degree
of remaining nodes before the links that are disconnected are removed. Removing the
links which connect to the deleted nodes of a randomly connected network is equivalent
to randomly removing a (1 − p˜) fraction of links of the remaining nodes. Using the same
approach as in ref. [33], on can show that the generating function of the remaining nodes
after random removal of (1− p˜) fraction of links is equal to the original distribution of the
network with a new argument z = 1 − p˜ + xp˜. Thus the generating function of the new
degree distribution of the nodes left in network A after their links to the removed nodes are
also removed is
GAc(x) ≡ GAb(1− p˜+ p˜x). (2.10)
The only difference in the cascading process under targeted attack from the case under
random attack is the first stage where the initial attack is exerted on the network A. If
we find a network A′ with generating function G˜A0(x), such that after a random attack
with (1 − p) fraction of removed, the generating function of nodes left in A′ is the same
as GAc(x), then the targeted attack problem on interdependent networks A and B can be
solved as a random attack problem on interdependent networks A′ and B. We find G˜A0(x)
by solving the equation G˜A0(1− p+ px) = GAc(x) and from Eq.(2.10),
G˜A0(x) = GAb(1 +
p˜
p
(x− 1)). (2.11)
Up to now, we have mapped the problem of cascade of failures of nodes in interdependent
networks caused by an initial targeted attack to the problem of a random attack. Since the
derivation of equations only depends on the generating function of network A, this approach
can be generally applied to study both single networks with dependency links [46] and other
more general interdependent network models, as long as the nodes in those networks are
17
randomly connected.
2.5 Results
Next we can apply the framework developed in Ref. [7], gA(p) = 1−G˜A0[1−p(1−fA)], where
fA is a function of p that satisfies the transcendental equation fA = G˜A1[1 − p(1 − fA)].
Analogous equations exist for network B. As the interdependent networks achieve a mutually
connected giant component, the fraction of nodes left in giant component is p∞. The system
satisfies the equations
x = pgA(y),
y = pgB(x),
(2.12)
where the two unknown variables x and y satisfy p∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y). Eliminating y
from these equations, we obtain a single equation
x = pgA[pgB(x)]. (2.13)
The critical case (p = pc) emerges when both sides of this equation have equal derivatives,
1 = p2
dgA
dx
[pgB(x)]
dgB
dx
(x)|x=xc,p=pc. (2.14)
which, together with Eq.(2.13), yields the solution for pc and the critical size of the gi-
ant mutually connected component, p∞(pc) = xcgB(xc). In general, there is no explicit
expression as a solution and pc and xc can be found numerically.
We now analyze the specific classes of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [15, 16] and scale-free (SF) [18,
47–49] networks. The lines in Fig. 2.1 represent the critical thresholds, pc, for coupled
coupled SF networks with different α obtained by solutions of Eq.(2.13) and Eq.(2.14),
which are in excellent agreement with simulations. Several conclusions from Fig. 2.1 are as
follows: (i) Remarkably, while pc for a single SF network approaches to 0 quickly when α
becomes zero or negative (see also [40]), pc for interdependent networks is non-zero for the
entire range of α (Fig. 2.1(a)). This follows from the fact that failure of the least connected
18
0 5 10
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p c
SF,<k>=4,λ=2.8
single network
SF,<k>=4,λ=2.8
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p c
SF,<k>=3, λ=3.4
SF,<k>=4, λ=2.8
SF,<k>=5.55, λ=2.5
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: (a) Dependence of pc on α for SF single and interdependent networks with
average degree 〈k〉 = 4. The lower cut-off of the degree is m = 2. The horizontal lines
represent the upper and lower limits of pc. The black dashed line represents pc for SF free
network. (b) Values of pc vs α for SF interdependent networks with different λ and lower
cut-off m = 2. The λ in the legends of both the graphs are approximate numbers.
nodes in one network may lead to failure of well connected nodes in the other network, which
makes interdependent networks significantly more difficult to protect compared to a single
network. (ii) targeted attacks (α > 0) and defense strategies (α < 0) are more effective for
interdependent networks with broader degree distributions. In Fig. 2.1(b), comparing the
lines of λ = 2.5, λ = 2.8 and λ = 3.4 with m = 2, one can see that the lower is λ the more
sensitive is pc to the change of α. Accordingly, robustness of interdependent networks with
broader degree distributions decreases more under the same targeted attacks.
Simplified forms for GAb(x), GAc(x) and G˜A0(x) from Eqs.(2.8),(2.10) and (2.11) exist
when α = 1,
GAb(x) =
1
p
∑
k
P (k)fkxk =
1
p
GA0(fx), (2.15)
GAc(x) =
1
p
GA0(f(1− p˜+ p˜x)), (2.16)
G˜A0(x) =
1
p
GA0(
p˜
p
f(x− 1) + f). (2.17)
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where GA0(x) is the original generating function of the network A, f = G
−1
A0(p) and p˜ =
G′
A0
(f)
G′
A0
(1) f .
Explicit solutions of percolation quantities exist for the case of interdependent Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi networks, when α = 1 and both of the two networks are initially attacked simu-
taneously. The two networks originally have generating functions GA0(x) and GB0(x).
Initially, (1 − p1) and (1 − p2) fraction of nodes are targeted (according to Eq. (1) and
α = 1) and removed from network A and B respectively. Similarly, we start by finding
the equivalent networks A′ and B′ such that a fraction (1− p1p2) of random initial attack
on both of the networks has the same effect as (1 − p1) and (1 − p2) fraction of nodes are
intentionally removed from network A and network B respectively. After removal of initially
failed nodes and all the links that connect to the removed nodes, according to Eq.(2.16),
the generating function of the nodes left in network A is
GAc(x) =
1
p1
GA0(f1(1− p˜1 + p˜1x)), (2.18)
where f1 ≡ G
−1
A0(p1), p˜1 ≡ f1
G′
A0
(f1)
G′
A0
(1) . Furthermore, (1 − p2) fraction of the remaining A-
nodes are randomly removed. Because each remaining A-node’s corresponding B-node in
network B has a possibility (1− p2) to be initially attacked, which leads to fail this A-node.
The generating function of the nodes left in network A is
GAd(x) ≡ GAc(1− p2 + p2x) =
1
p1
GA0(f1 + p˜1f1p2(x− 1)). (2.19)
Now we can find the generating function of the equivalent network A′ by G˜A0(1 − p1p2 +
p1p2x) = GAd(x):
G˜A0(x) =
1
p1
GA0(
p˜1
p1
f1(x− 1) + f1). (2.20)
The same holds for network B′.
For ER networks, the generating function is G0(x) = e
〈k〉(x−1) [33], so f1 =
ln(p1)
〈k〉
1
+1,f2 =
ln(p2)
〈k〉
2
+ 1, G˜A0(x) = G˜A1(x) = e
〈k〉
1
f2
1
(x−1) and G˜B0(x) = G˜B1(x) = e
〈k〉
2
f2
2
(x−1). From
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Eq.(2.12),
x = p1p2gA(y) = p1p2(1− fA),
y = p1p2gB(x) = p1p2(1− fB),
(2.21)
where
fA = e
〈k〉
1
f2
1
y(fA−1),
fB = e
〈k〉
2
f2
2
x(fB−1).
(2.22)
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Figure 2.2: Values of p∞ vs p when both networks are initially attacked. Both networks
in the interdependent networks are ER or SF networks with the same average degree.
The symbols represent simulation data (N = 106 nodes). The solid lines are theoretical
predictions, Eq.(2.23). The dashed line represents simulation data for interdependent scale-
free networks with λ = 2.8, 〈k〉 = 4. All results are for α = 1. Inset: Values of pc vs average
degree of ER networks. The symbols represent simulation data, while the line is the theory,
Eq.(2.24).
In the case 〈k〉1 = 〈k〉2 = 〈k〉 and p1 = p2 = p, we find that
p∞ = p
2(1− e〈k〉f
2p∞). (2.23)
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where f1 = f2 ≡ f =
ln(p)
〈k〉 + 1, and pc satisfies relation:
〈k〉 p2cfc = 2.4554, (2.24)
with fc =
ln(pc)
〈k〉 +1. Fig. 2.2 shows that the simulation confirms well the theory. Compared
to the case of random attack on one network, where pc = 2.4554/ 〈k〉 [7], in Eq.(2.24),
the factor fc reflects the effect of targeted attack on high degree nodes to increase pc.
The term p2c in Eq.(2.24) is since we are initially attacking both networks simutaneously
instead of only attacking one network. Indeed for the case of initial random attack on two
networks simultaneously, from Eq.(2.21) and fA = e
〈k〉
1
y(fA−1), fB = e
〈k〉
1
y(fB−1) [7] we
obtain 〈k〉 p2c = 2.4554.
2.6 Summary
In summary, we developed a theoretical framework for understanding the robustness of
interdependent networks under targeted attacks on specific degree nodes. We introduce a
method and show that targeted-attack problems in networks can be mapped to random-
attack problems by transforming the networks which are under initial attack. It provides a
routine method (if the random-attack case is solvable) to study the targeted-attack problems
in both single networks and randomly connected and uncorrelated interdependent networks,
i.e. (i) the case of three or more interdependent networks, (ii) the case of partially coupled
interdependent networks, (iii) the case in which a node from network A can depend on more
than one node from network B. By applying the method, we find that in contrast to single
networks, when the highly connected nodes are defended (α < 0), the percolation threshold
pc has a finite non-zero value which is significantly larger than zero. For example, when
the degrees of all nodes are known and nodes can only be damaged from lower degree to
high degree (α→ −∞), pc ≈ 0.46 for coupled SF networks with λ = 2.8 and 〈k〉 = 4 while
pc for the same single SF network is 0 (Fig. 2.1). The implications of the present study
are dramatic. The current methods applied to design robust networks and improve the
22
robustness of current networks, i.e. protecting the high degree nodes, need to be modified
to apply to interdependent network systems.
Chapter 3
The Robustness Of Interdependent
Clustered Networks
3.1 Introduction
In a system of interdependent networks, the functioning of nodes in one network is depen-
dent upon the functioning of nodes in other networks of the system. The failure of nodes
in one network can cause nodes in other networks to fail, which in turn can cause further
damage to the first network, leading to cascading failures and catastrophic consequences.
For example, power blackouts across entire countries have been caused by cascading fail-
ures between the interdependent communication and power grid systems [4, 50]. Because
infrastructures in our modern society are becoming increasingly interdependent, under-
standing how systemic robustness is affected by these interdependencies is essential if we
are to design infrastructures that are resilient [1, 6, 51, 52]. Another example is the human
organism is an integrated network where complex physiological systems, each with its own
regulatory mechanisms, continuously interact, and where failure of one network can trig-
ger a breakdown of the entire system [53]. In addition to research carried out on specific
systems [54–62], a mathematical framework [7] and its generalizations [8, 63, 64] have been
developed recently. These studies use a percolation approach to analyse a system of two
or more interdependent networks subject to cascading failure [65, 66]. It was found that
interdependent networks are significantly more vulnerable than their stand-alone counter-
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parts. The dynamics of cascading failure are strongly affected by the structure patterns of
network components and by the interaction between networks. This research has focused
almost exclusively on random interdependent networks in which clustering within compo-
nent networks is small or approaches zero. Clustering quantifies the propensity for two
neighbours of the same vertex to also be neighbors of each other, forming triangle-shaped
configurations in the network [27–29]. Unlike random networks in which there is very lit-
tle or no clustering, real-world networks exhibit significant clustering. Recent studies have
shown that, for single networks, both bond percolation and site percolation in clustered
networks have higher epidemic thresholds compared to the unclustered networks [67–73].
Here we present a mathematical framework for understanding how the robustness of
interdependent networks is affected by clustering within the network components. We
extend the percolation method developed by Newman [67] for single clustered networks to
coupled clustered networks. We find that interdependent networks that exhibit significant
clustering are more vulnerable to random node failure than networks without significant
clustering. We are able to simplify our interdependent networks model—without losing its
general applicability—by reducing its size to two networks, A and B, each having the same
number of nodes N . The N nodes in A and B have bidirectional dependency links to each
other, establishing a one-to-one correspondence. Thus the functioning of a node in network
A depends on the functioning of the corresponding node in network B and vice versa. Each
network is defined by a joint distribution Pst (generating function G0(x, y) =
∑∞
s,t=0 Pstx
syt)
that specifies the fraction of nodes connected to s single edges and t triangles [67]. The
conventional degree of each node is thus k = s+ 2t. The clustering coefficient c is
c =
3× (number of triangles in network)
number of connected triples
=
N
∑
st tPst
N
∑
k

 k
2

Pk
. (3.1)
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3.2 Site Percolation of Single Clustered Networks
We begin by studying the generating function of remaining nodes after a fraction of (1− p)
nodes is randomly removed from one clustered network. After the nodes are removed, we
define t′i to be the number of triangles of which node i is a part, d
′
i to be the number
of single edges that form triangles prior to attack, and n′i to be the number of stand-
alone single edges prior to attack. This network is thus defined by the joint distribution
Pn′,t′,d′ . The probability that a node has n
′ single edges from single edges is the sum of
all the probabilities that nodes with more than n′ single edges will have exactly n′ edges
remaining, which is Q1(n
′) ≡
∞∑
s=n′

 s
n′

 pn′(1 − p)s−n′ . Similarly, the probability that a
node has t′ triangles is the sum of all the probabilities that nodes with more than t′ triangles
will have exactly t′ triangles remaining. Since the probability that a triangle will survive is
p2, the sum is Q2(t
′) ≡
∞∑
t=t′

 t
t′

 p2t′(1 − p2)t−t′ . The probability that a triangle corner
will have one edge broken is 2p(1−p)
1−p2
and the probability that it will have both edges broken
is (1−p)
2
1−p2
. Thus the probability that a node had d′ single edges forming triangles prior to
their destruction is Q3(d
′) ≡

 t− t′
d′

 [2p(1−p)
1−p2
]d
′
[ (1−p)
2
1−p2
]t−t
′−d′ . Combining these three,
we have the corresponding generating function
G(x, y, z, p) =
∑
n′,t′,d′
Pn′,t′,d′x
n′yt
′
zd
′
=
∞∑
n′=0
xn
′
Q1(n
′)
∞∑
t′=0
yt
′
Q2(t
′)
t−t′∑
d′=0
zd
′
Q3(d
′)Ps,t
= G0(xp+ 1− p, yp
2 + 2zp(1− p) + (1− p)2). (3.2)
We define s′ = n′ + d′ to be the total number of single links of a node after attack.
The joint degree distribution after attack is P ′s′,t′ which satisfies P
′
s′,t′ =
∑s′
n′=0 Pn′,t′,d′ , with
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d′ = s′ − n′. The generating function of P ′s′,t′ is
G0(x, y, p) =
∑
s′,t′
P ′s′,t′x
s′yt
′
=
∞∑
s′=0
s′∑
n′=0
∑
t′
Pn′,t′,d′x
s′yt
′
=
∑
n′,d′,t′
Pn′,t′,d′x
n′yt
′
xd
′
= G(x, y, x, p). (3.3)
Therefore, the generating function of the remaining network after attack is
G0(x, y, p) = G0(xp + 1− p, yp
2 + 2xp(1 − p) + (1− p)2). (3.4)
The size of the giant component g(p) of the remaining network according to Ref. [67] is
g(p) = 1−G0(u, v
2, p), (3.5)
where
u = Gq(u, v
2, p), (3.6)
v = Gr(u, v
2, p),
andGq(x, y, p) =
1
µ
∂G0(x,y,p)
∂x , Gr(x, y, p) =
1
ν
∂G0(x,y,p)
∂y where µ and ν are the average number
of single links and triangles per node, respectively.
As an example, consider the case when (1− p) fraction of nodes are removed randomly
from a network with doubly Poisson degree distribution
Pst = e
−µµ
s
s!
e−ν
νt
t!
, (3.7)
where the parameters µ and ν are the average numbers of single edges and triangles per ver-
tex, respectively. According to Eq. (3.1), the clustering coefficient is c = 2ν
2ν+(µ+2ν)2
. Then,
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Figure 3.1: Size of giant component g(p) in single networks with degree distribution Eq. (3.7)
and average degree 〈k〉 = 4, as a function of p, the fraction of remaining nodes after random
removal of nodes. Curves are from theory Eq. 3.8, symbols are from simulation.
G0(x, y) = e
µ(x−1)eν(y−1) andG0(x, y, p) = Gq(x, y, p) = Gr(x, y, p) = e
[µp+2p(1−p)ν](x−1)eνp
2(y−1),
and u = v = 1− g(p), leading to
g(p) = 1− e[µp+2p(1−p)ν]g(p)eνp
2(g(p)2−2g(p)). (3.8)
This equation is a closed-form solution for the giant component g(p) and can be solved
numerically. The critical case appears when the derivatives of the both sides of Eq. (3.8)
are equal. That leads to the critical condition 〈k〉pc = 1, which is independent of clustering.
However the degree distribution of the doubly Poisson model changes as we keep the average
degree and change the clustering coefficient. When the degree distribution is fixed, the
critical threshold actually increases as clustering increases [70, 71]. Furthermore, Fig. 3.1
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shows the resulting giant component as a function of p. Note that single networks with
higher clustering have smaller giant components.
3.3 Degree-Degree Correlation
When constructing clustering in a network, it is usually impossible to avoid generating
degree-degree correlations. To better understand the effect of clustering on degree-degree
correlations, we present an analytical expression of degree correlation as a function of the
clustering coefficient for a doubly Poisson-clustered network—see Eq. (3.7).
The degree-degree correlation [74] can be expressed as
ρD =
N1N3 −N
2
2
N1
N∑
i=1
d3iN
2
2
(3.9)
where Nm is the total number of m hop walks between all possible node pairs (i, j) including
cases i = j.
The generating function of the degree of a node in the network is
∞∑
s,t=0
Pstz
s+2t =
G0(z, z
2). Let qst be the fraction of nodes with s single edges and t triangles that are reached
by traversing a random single link, where s includes the traversed link and rst is the frac-
tion of nodes with s single edges and t triangles reached by traversing a link of a triangle,
qst =
sPs,t
〈s〉 , rst =
tPs,t
〈t〉 . Their corresponding generating functions are Gq(x, y) =
1
〈s〉
∂G0(x,y)
∂x x
and Gr(x, y) =
1
〈t〉
∂G0(x,y)
∂y y. Moreover, N3 =
∑
i
∑
j
aijN2(j), where N2(j) is the total num-
ber of two-hop walks starting from node j. The number of three-hop walks from a node
i is equal to the total number of two-hop walks starting from all of its neighbours. Thus,
N3 =
∑
j
kjN2(j), where the number of two-hop walks starting from a node j with degree kj
will be counted kj times in N3. Equivalently, N3 = N
∑
st
(s+ 2t)Ps,tN2(s, t), where N2(s, t)
is the number of two hop walks from a node with s single edges and t triangles. The gen-
erating function of the number of single edges and of triangles reached in two hops from
a random node is G2(x, y) =
∑
st
Ps,t · G
s
q(x, y) · G
2t
r (x, y). The generating function of the
total number of links and of triangles reached within three hops starting from all nodes is
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G3(x, y) = N
∑
st
Ps,t · (Gq(x, y))
s(s+2t) · (Gr(x, y))
2t(s+2t). The number Nk of k-hop walks
can be approximated by its mean in a large network
N1 = N〈k〉,
N2 = N
∂G2
∂x
|x = 1, y = 1 + 2N
∂G2
∂y
|x = 1, y = 1
N3 =
∂G3
∂x
|x = 1, y = 1 + 2
∂G3
∂y
|x = 1, y = 1
When both s and t follow a Poisson distribution,
G0(x, y) = e
µ(x−1)eν(y−1)
Gq(x, y) = G0(x, y)x
Gr(x, y) = G0(x, y)y.
In this case,
N1 = N〈k〉
N2 = N 〈k〉
(
〈k〉
1− c
+ 1
)
N3 =
(
〈k〉3 + 2〈k〉2 + 4ν〈k〉 + 〈k〉+ 6ν
)
N
N∑
i=1
d3i =
(
〈k〉3 + 3 〈k〉2 + (6ν + 1) 〈k〉+ 6ν
)
N,
which together with Eq. (3.9) leads to
ρD =
c− c2 − 〈k〉c2
1− c+ 〈k〉c− 2〈k〉c2
, (3.10)
where c is the clustering coefficient, Eq. (3.1).
Figure 3.2 shows the relation between the degree correlation and the clustering coefficient
c for a Poissonian network [see Eq. (3.7)], for two given average degrees (〈k〉 = 3 and 4).
The figure shows a positive degree-degree correlation across the entire range, which means
the model is assortative [70]. The degree-degree correlation increases until c achieves half
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Figure 3.2: Degree-degrees correlation as a function of the clustering coefficient for Poisson
network (Eq. (3.7)) with average degree 〈k〉 = 3 and 4. Curves are from theory (Eq. 3.10)
and symbols from simulations.
of its maximum and then decreases to zero when c reaches its maximum. When c is 0 or
the maximum, the nodes connect to either all single links or all triangles, respectively.
3.4 Percolation on Interdependent Clustered Networks
To study how clustering within interdependent networks affects a system’s robustness, we
apply the interdependent networks framework [7]. In interdependent networks A and B,
a fraction (1 − p) of nodes is first removed from network A. Then the size of the giant
components of networks A and B in each cascading failure step is defined to be p1, p2, ...,
pn, which are calculated iteratively
pn = µn−1gA(µn−1),n is odd,
pn = µngB(µn),n is even,
(3.11)
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where µ0 = p and µn are intermediate variables that satisfy
µn = pgA(µn−1),n is odd,
µn = pgB(µn−1),n is even.
(3.12)
As interdependent networks A and B form a stable mutually-connected giant component,
n → ∞ and µn = µn−2, the fraction of nodes left in the giant component is p∞. This
system satisfies
x = pgA(y),
y = pgB(x),
(3.13)
where the two unknown variables x and y can be used to calculate p∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y).
Eliminating y from these equations, we obtain a single equation
x = pgA[pgB(x)]. (3.14)
The critical case (p = pc) emerges when both sides of this equation have equal derivatives,
1 = p2
dgA
dx
[pgB(x)]
dgB
dx
(x)|x=xc,p=pc, (3.15)
which, together with Eq. (3.14), yields the solution for pc and the critical size of the giant
mutually-connected component, p∞(pc) = xcgB(xc).
Consider for example the case in which each network has doubly-Poisson degree distri-
butions as in Eq. (3.7). From Eq. (3.13), we have x = p(1− uA), y = p(1− uB), where
uA = vA = e
[µAy+2y(1−y)µA ](uA−1)+νAp
2(v2A−1),
uB = vB = e
[µBx+2x(1−x)µB ](uB−1)+νBp
2(v2B−1).
If the two networks have the same clustering, µ ≡ µA = µB and ν ≡ νA = νB, p∞ is then
p∞ = p(1− e
νp2
∞
−(µ+2ν)p∞)2. (3.16)
The giant component, p∞, for interdependent clustered networks can thus be obtained
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Figure 3.3: (a) Size of mutually connected giant component as a function of cascading fail-
ure steps n. Results are for c = 1, p = 0.64 (below pc), p = 0.66 (at pc) and p = 0.7 (above
pc). Lines represent theory (Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12)) and dots are from simulations. Note
that at pc there are large fluctuations. (b) Size of giant component, p∞, in interdependent
networks with both networks having clustering via degree distribution Eq. (3.7) and average
degree 〈k〉 = 4, as a function of p. Dashed lines are number of iterations (NOI) before cas-
cading failure stops obtained by simulation. The star curve is for shuffled c = 0.2 network,
which keeps the same degree distribution but without clustering and without degree-degree
correlation. Inset: Green squares and solid line represents critical thresholds, pc, of interde-
pendent networks as a function of clustering coefficient c. Red dashed line represents critical
threshold of shuffled interdependent networks which originally has clustering coefficient c.
The shuffled networks have zero clustering and degree-degree correlation, but has the same
degree distribution as the original clustered networks. In all figures, symbols and dashed
lines represent simulation, solid curves represent theoretical results.
by solving Eq. (3.16). Note that when ν = 0 we obtain from Eq. (3.16) the result obtained
in Ref. [7] for random interdependent ER networks. Figure 3.3a, using numerical simula-
tion, compares the size of the giant component after n stages of cascading failure with the
theoretical prediction of Eq. (3.11). When p = 0.7 and p = 0.64, which are not near the
critical threshold (pc = 0.6609), the agreement with simulation is perfect. Below and near
the critical threshold, the simulation initially agrees with the theoretical prediction but then
deviates for large n due to the random fluctuations of structure in different realizations [7].
By solving Eq. (3.16), we have p∞ as a function of p in Fig. 3.3b for a given average de-
gree and several values of clustering coefficients and in Fig. 3.4a for a given clustering and
for different average degree values. As the figure shows, when higher clustering within a
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network is introduced, the percolation transition yields a higher value of pc (see inset of
Fig. 3.3b).
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Figure 3.4: (a) Size of giant component as a function of p for fixed clustering coefficient
c = 0.1 and different average degrees. From right to left 〈k〉 = 3, 4, 5, ..., 9. (b) Critical
threshold pc as a function of average degree for different clustering coefficients. The solid
curves are for interdependent networks and the dashed curve is for single networks. Symbols
and curves represent simulation and theoretical predictions respectively.
When clustering changes in this doubly Poisson distribution model, degree distribution
and degree-degree correlation also change. First, to address the influence of the degree
distribution, we study the critical thresholds of shuffled clustered networks. Shuffled clus-
tered networks have neither clustering nor degree-degree distribution but keep the same
degree distribution as the original clustered networks. The brown dashed curve in Fig. 3.3b
represents the giant component of interdependent shuffled clustered networks with original
clustering c = 0.2. The figure shows that the difference in pc between the c = 0 network
and the shuffled c = 0.2 network is only 0.01, while the difference between the c = 0 and the
c = 0.2 networks is 0.12. In addtion, c = 0.2 clustered networks has no degree-degree corre-
lation (Fig. 3.2), which means the 0.12 shift of pc is due to clustering and not to a change in
degree distribution. We also show the critical thresholds of interdependent shuffled clustered
networks as the red dashed line in the inset of Fig. 3.3b. Note that the change of degree dis-
tribution barely shifts the critical threshold. We next discuss the effect of the degree-degree
correlation on the change of critical threshold. From Ref. [75], the degree assortativity alone
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monotonously increases the percolation critical threshold of interdependent networks. Be-
cause in our case degree-degree correlation first increases and then decreases (see Fig. 3.2),
while the critical threshold of interdependent networks increases monotonously as cluster-
ing increases (see inset of Fig. 3.3b), we conclude that clustering alone increases the value
of pc. Thus clustering within networks reduces the robustness of interdependent networks.
This probably occurs because clustered networks contain some links in triangles that do
not contribute to the giant component, and in each stage of cascading failure the giant
component will be smaller than in the unclustered case.
We also study the effect of the mean degree 〈k〉 on the percolation critical point. Fig-
ures 3.4a and 3.4b both show that, when clustering is fixed, the percolation critical point of
interdependent networks decreases as the average degree 〈k〉 of network increases, making
the system more robust. Figure 3.4b also shows that a larger minimum average degree is
needed to maintain the network against collapse without any node removal as clustering
increases.
3.5 Conclusion and Summary
To conclude, based on Newman’s single network clustering model, we present a generating-
function formalism solution for site percolation on both single and interdependent clustered
networks. We also derive an analytical expression, Eq. (3.10), for degree-degree correlation
as a function of the clustering coefficient for a doubly-Poisson network. Our results help
us better understand the effect of clustering on the percolation of interdependent networks.
We discuss the influence of a change of degree distribution and the degree-degree correlation
associated with clustering in the model on the critical threshold of interdependent networks
and conclude that pc for interdependent networks increases when networks are more highly
clustered. In the clustering model we are using, high clustering is hard to reach, because of
lack of higher order cliques than triangles. Recently, models which can have higher clustering
and are analytically solvable were proposed [73, 76], which are important complements to the
clustering model in this letter. We believe that with very high clustering, the relationship
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between the robustness of interdependent networks and clustering would be similar: keeping
the degree distribution the same, interdependent networks would be easier to break down
under random failure when clustering of the networks are higher.
Chapter 4
Identifying Influential Directors in the
United States Corporate Governance
Network
4.1 Introduction
Corporate governance is important for developing company policies and assuring business
growth and innovation. For successful industry positioning and competitiveness, companies
tend to elect directors who are influential and well known in the business world as well as
in the community. We assume that the influence of a director is reflected by the impact
that a director can have on the whole industry. Usually an influential director functions as
a model in the industry and can impose his/her philosophy to a wide range of companies.
Many rankings of powerful and influential people have been created by business magazines
based on interviews and public opinion. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no quantitative studies conducted on influence of corporate directors.
The influential directors, according to research done by economists, are usually those
who serve on many company boards, because they are more likely to be active in various
policy planning organizations and form a leading edge of the “capitalist class” [77]. These
directors also often constitute a vanguard of the corporate elite, typically they are often
in the forefront of innovation, and well integrated in the community [78, 79]. In addition,
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directors of large companies are considered to be more important than those who serve on
small company boards, which is emphasized by magazines that create lists of the “most
powerful people”.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of a subnetwork of the company-director bipartite network. Nodes
shown as quares represent directors, while nodes shown as circles depict companies. If a
director serves on the board of a company, a link exists between them. This subnetwork
includes Martha Stewart, the corporate boards on which she serves, and the other directors
who serve on common boards with Martha Stewart including the additional companies on
which boards these directors serve.
We define the total capitalization of all the companies (TCC) with which a director is
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affiliated as a quantity that contains both the number and the size of the companies on
which boards a director serves. We argue that the number and the size of the companies
with which a director is affiliated does not entirely reflect the influence of a director. To
illustrate this point, we show in Fig. 4.1 an example of Martha Stewart in the year 2001
when she was named the third most powerful woman in America by Ladies Home Journal.
As illustrated in this figure, Martha Stewart was director of only two companies, Revlon
Corp. and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia. If we rank the directors by TCC, Martha
Stewart would only be ranked in the bottom 16th percentile in the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) directors database. Fig. 4.1 shows that the directors who serve
on the same boards as Martha Stewart are also affiliated with many large companies. We
argue that Martha Stewart’s influence comes from her proximity to directors who serve on
the boards of these large companies. This indicates that the relative position of a director
(node) in the network contributes to this director’s influence, i.e. the influence of a director
depends not only on his/her own characteristics but also on the characteristics of the other
directors surrounding a specific director.
In this paper, we develop a systematic measure named influence factor (I), that incorpo-
rates both the topological and non-topological characteristics of directors in the network, to
quantitatively study the influence of directors. In our approach, the influence of a director
is based on the amount of information a director obtains from the other directors due to
his/her position in the network. In director’s network, nodes represent directors and links
between directors represent their service on common corporate boards. In such a network,
we assume that directors acquire information from the companies with which they are affil-
iated, and spread this information to other directors through information-sharing between
connected directors [80]. The influence factor measure is affected by common centrality
measures taken from complex network theory such as degree [81], betweenness [82], close-
ness [83] and the capitalization of companies. According to the influence factor method,
Martha Stewart is ranked in the 84th percentile in 2001, in contrast to only 16th percentile
when ranked by TCC. We also find that Douglas Leone, who was named as one of the
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top 10 venture capitalists in US by Forbes, is only in the 30th percentile when ranked by
TCC. However, based on the influence factor method, he is ranked in the 90th percentile
in 2001. We then statisticly compare the influence factor method with TCC and common
centrality measures, such as degree, betweenness, closeness, K-shell [84–86] and Bonacich
centrality [30, 31, 87], which are usually assumed to be equivalent to influence [88–90]. We
apply all these methods to identify the influential directors who are selected as powerful
people by popular business opinion, such as “Powerful Women in Business” from Fortune
magazine, “Powerful People in Networking” from Networking World magazine and “100
Most Influential People in Finance” from Treasury and Risk Management magazine. We
find that for all three cases the influence factor method is consistently among the most
efficient methods to identify the most influential directors.
4.2 Data
We build a network of directors based on the IRRC directors database [91] which contains
information about approximately 1,600 US corporations and 10,000 directors per year from
1996 to 2006.
We compare our results with popular rankings from magazines including:
1) The ranking of “50 most powerful women in business” from Fortune for 9 years
from 1998-2006. Each year, Fortune interviews industry experts, Wall Street analysts and
executive recruiters to identify powerful women. The importance of these business women
is broadly valued by revenues and profits controlled, their influence inside the company,
the importance of the business in the global economy, and its impact on American culture.
Each year the rankings include 50 female directors. We regard the same person in different
years as a different entity. Thus, there are 450 entities for 9 years, of which 193 entities are
included in the IRRC directors database.
2) The list of “the most powerful people in networking” from Network World for 9 years
from 1997-2006 except 2001 (due to magazine policy change in 2001). From 1997 to 2000,
the lists include 25 people and from 2002 to 2006, they include 50 people each year. Thus
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there are 350 entities, in which 112 entities are included in IRRC directors database.
3) The list of “100 most influential people in finance” from Treasury and Risk Manage-
ment for 4 years from 2003-2006. The lists include 400 entities, in which 47 are included in
IRRC directors database.
Less than half of the influential people listed in these business magazines are included in
the IRRC directors database, since many influential people selected by the magazines are
not directors. In this article, we focus only on the power of influential directors.
4.3 Directors’ Network and Its Properties
For each year, we create a bipartite network of companies and directors [92] based on the
IRRC database. As shown in Fig. 4.2, a node in this network represents alternatively a
director or a company. A link between a director and a company represents the fact that
the director serves on the board of the company. The largest connected cluster of the
bipartite network includes over 80% of the companies and directors in the database, while
the second largest cluster only contains less than 3% of companies and directors. Given this
topology, we only study the largest cluster of the network. In a typical year, e.g. 1999, the
largest cluster contains 1, 528 companies and 11, 116 directors. By projecting the bipartite
network into one-mode [93], we create a director’s network (Fig. 4.2). The existence of a
link between two directors means that they serve on at least one common board. Note that
in this network, directors within one company’s board form a fully connected cluster. The
overall network is constructed by attaching these fully connected clusters to each other.
Previous studies [92] analyze statistical properties of similar director’s networks, such as
degree distribution. Consistently, Fig. 4.3 shows that the tail of the CDF of degree in our
director’s network is exponential, exp(−k/kc), where k is the node degree of a director and
kc is the exponential decay parameter. Up to a degree of 8, all the CDFs for different years
display a plateau as a consequence of the fact that 8 is the characteristic degree of directors
for every year. This means that a large number of directors have degree around 8. Because
80% of directors serve on only one corporate board, the characteristic degree of directors
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is also the characteristic size of the boards. Directors who serve on many corporate boards
usually have large degree and their degree distribution is described by kc. We find that kc
decreases over time from 1997 to 2006. Since the characteristic size of the boards is stable,
this indicates a tendency for directors to serve on fewer boards [94].
4.4 Influence Factor Measure
We introduce a model to analyze the influence of directors by defining the influence factor
for each director based on the level of information that the director can obtain from the
entire network. The rationale for using the amount of information to value the influence
of directors is that (i) information is a valuable commodity in corporate governance, and
the more information the director has, the more valuable as a director she or he is; (ii)
a director who has access to company information tends to be able to impose his or her
influence on those companies, which indicates that the amount of information a director
obtains reflects the level of the influence he or she has. These two points coincides with our
view of influence of a director. The first point enables directors to impose their influence
well and strongly. The second point enables directors to impact a wide range of the whole
industry.
The influence factor model is defined as follows:
(i) Each company is considered a source of information, which can be obtained by the
directors who serve on the company’s board. The amount of information embedded in the
company is valued by the market capitalization of the company, based on the fact that
directors who can obtain information from and impose influence on large companies should
be more influential than directors who are affiliated with a marginal company.
(ii) After information is obtained by directors, it flows in the director’s network by
information-sharing between directors who are connected.
In Fig. 4.4, we demonstrate, as an example, how the influence factor of director u is
calculated:
(i) We determine the amount of information wj for each company by their market cap-
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italization. If we choose to study the influence of directors within the technology industry,
we set wj for the companies from other industries to 0, e.g. wA = 0, wD = 0, because A
and D are financial companies.
(ii) Distances between each director and director u are calculated in the director’s net-
work as shown in Fig. 4.4 and we define dj as the shortest distance between director u and
those directors who serve on the board of company j.
(iii) We reduce the information of each company by rj until it reaches director u. rj
is the information reduction rate per unit distance. Since this reduction rate differs from
pair of directors to another pair depending on people’s nature and relationship, we assume
rj to be some random number following certain possibility distribution. Without further
knowledge of how people share information with each other we assume for simplicity a
uniform distribution and choose rj to be a random number between 0 and 1. All information
relevant to company E can be accessed by director y (who sits on the board of E), but
only a fraction, (wE · rE1), is passed to director x (who sits with y on another board), and
so on. Thus, the amount of information about company E that director u can access is
SuE ≡ wE · rE1 · rE2 · rE3.
(iv) By adding the information of all the companies we find that the total information
that passes through director u is Su = SuA + SuB + SuC + SuD + SuE + SuF .
(v) Then the influence factor (I) is calculated as the percentage of total amount of
information that flows through director u by Iu ≡ Su/
∑
j wj .
In general, the influence factor I of a director i is defined as
Ii ≡
∑
j wjrj1rj2...rjdj∑
j wj
, (4.1)
where wj is the amount of information embedded in company j based on market capitaliza-
tion, dj is the shortest distance between director i and the directors in company j, which
represents the number of intermediaries the information of company j has passed before it
reaches director i, and rj is the random information reduction rate. We obtain the influence
factor of director i as the average of 50 random realizations of Ii calculated by Eq. (1).
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The normalized influence factor (NIF) of each director is then defined as
I˜i ≡
Ii− < I >
σ(I)
, (4.2)
where < I >≡
∑n
i=1 Ii/n is the annual average of the influence factor of all directors and
σ(I) is the standard deviation of influence factors of directors for one year. A negative
value of the NIF does not mean that a director has negative influence. Only the relative
rank is meaningful, e.g. a director with NIF −0.5 is more influential than a director who
has NIF −1.1.
4.5 Properties Of The Influence Factor
For different years, as shown in Fig. 4.5(a), the influence factor I of directors for all the
companies follows different cumulative distribution functions (CDF) because the sizes of
the networks are different from year to year. Hence, the influence factor of directors are not
comparable over the years. However, we find that the CDFs of the NIF I˜ for different years
collapse to a single curve, which means that there is a scaling mechanism for I˜ for different
years. As shown in Fig. 4.5(b), the scaled curve fits the complement cumulative function
of the Gaussian function. This scaling property enables us to compare NIF of directors for
different years.
As described in the previous section, the information reduction rate is a random pa-
rameter. However, we find that the rankings of directors given by different realizations are
consistent with each other, as shown in Fig. 4.6. For each realizations, we calculate the
influence factor of directors and choose the top 100 and 1000 directors out of around 10,000
directors each year. We then find the overlaping percentage of these top directors for every
pair of realizations and plot the average overlaping ratio and error bar in the graph. Out
of 10,000 directors each year, there is about 60% overlap for top 100 directors and more
than 80% overlap for top 1,000 directors. This result justifies our approach since it shows
that the microscopic detail of how much information is shared by a certain pair of directors
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is not critical for the process of finding the most influential directors, instead the network
property plays an important role.
The influence factor of a director is calculated based on a progressively-reduced infor-
mation exchange process, which is relevant to director’s network topological properties.
We now compare the influence factor to TCC and to the other centrality measures such
as degree, K-shell, closeness, betweenness and Bonacich centrality. Fig.4.7 shows that the
influence factor is not significantly correlated with the centrality measures except close-
ness. The correlation between influence factor and closeness is not surprising because the
obtained information for calculating the influence factor depends strongly on the distance
between directors and the closeness measures the average distance from one director to all
the other directors in the network. However, in addition to distance, the influence factor
also depends on the capitalization of companies, which differentiates influence factor from
closeness. This difference is reflected in the relative variance of influence factor with re-
spect to closeness which is consistently larger than 10% as shown in the inset of Fig. 4.7(c).
Indeed, when we test the methods empirically in Section VI, we find that this variance
causes big difference between influence factor measure and closeness measure in identifying
powerful people.
In addition, in Fig. 4.7, we show the effect of Na, the number of companies with which
a director is affiliated. The graphs show that directors with larger Na tend to be more
powerful by all measures. However, there is always a large overlap between directors with
different Na, which supports our argument that directors who serve on more corporate
boards are not necessarily more powerful than those who serve on fewer boards.
As discussed in Section III, the director’s network is comprised of many fully connected
clusters. Because of this specific topology, we argue that degree, K-shell, and betweenness
can not entirely reflect the influence of a director. The degree and K-shell of the directors
depend largely on the size of the boards. If a board consists of a large number of directors,
all the members of that particular board will have high degrees and will be present in the
nucleus of the network by K-shell measure, even if, as an extreme example, that board is
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isolated from the rest of the network. Betweenness centrality of a node is defined as the
times that a node is on the shortest paths between all pairs of vertices. Because all directors
who serve only on one board will not occur on the shortest paths between other directors
and have zero betweenness, betweenness centrality does not distinguish the importance of
people who are only affiliated with one company’s board.
The influence factor is a measure affected by both nontopological properties, such as
the capitalization of the companies, and the topological properties of a director, such as
degree, closeness, etc. Moreover, the influence factor method is useful when applied to
a network consisting of many fully connected clusters. Below we test how efficient our
influence factor measure is in identifying influential people compared to TCC and existing
centrality measures.
4.6 Empirical Tests of Methods
In order to study the efficiency of a method in identifying the most influential directors from
the IRRC database, we first define an efficiency coefficient ǫ for each method as follows:
(1) Rank the directors according to the method that we want to test.
(2) Use the influential people lists made by popular business magazines as a benchmark.
(3) Examine the percentage (p) of people in the magazine lists who are included in the
top q percents of people from the database ranking, i.e. we select 10% (q = 10%) of people
who are ranked at the top of the database list and find that 30%(p = 30%) of the people in
the magazine lists appear in the top 10% of people from the database.
(4) Define the efficiency coefficient ǫ ≡ p/q. The larger the ǫ, the better the performance
of the particular method is in identifying influential directors.
4.6.1 Test: Power and influence of female directors in the US corporate
governance network
The ranking of “50 most powerful women in business” selects the 50 most powerful and
influential businesswomen in the US every year according to the criteria of Fortune. Every
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year, about 20 out of these 50 powerful women are included in our database. To improve
the statistics, we increase the sample size by mixing the executive women of all years from
1998 to 2006, which is validated by the scaling relation for I˜, indicating that the influence
factor of directors in different years are comparable (see Section V). This means that the
same executives in different years are treated as different entities. We find that between
1998 and 2006, 193 entities out of 450 are included in our database.
We apply the NIF, TCC, and common centrality measures to identify the influential
female directors selected by these rankings. We plot the values of the efficiency coefficient
ǫ versus q in Fig. 4.8(a) and p versus q in Fig. 4.8(b), showing that the NIF is more
efficient in identifying powerful female directors in the network compared to the other
centrality measures. Only the performance of TCC is comparable with the NIF. The top
10% powerful female directors identified by NIF from our database contain 40% of the
directors who appear in the “50 most powerful women in business” list from Fortune.
4.6.2 Test: Power and influence of directors in the US corporate gover-
nance network for specific industries
In addition to studying the influence of directors in the overall US corporate governance
network, we also analyze the influence of directors over a certain group of companies by
assigning zero weight to those companies that we do not want to consider, as described in
section IV. Here we examine influential directors for the financial industry and the network-
ing industry.
Treasury and risk management compiles annual rankings of the “100 most influential
people in finance”, selecting powerful people from the financial industry. In our database,
companies are categorized into different economic groups, which allows us to identify the
companies that belong to the financial industry. We assign zero weight to the companies
that are not in the financial economic groups to calculate the influence factor and NIF of
directors for financial industry by Eqs.(4.1) and ( 4.2). We then calculate the efficiency
coefficient ǫ for each method and plot our results in Fig. 4.8(c) and Fig. 4.8(d). We see
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that in the financial industry, only closeness provides similar performance to NIF, while the
other centrality measures provide inferior performance to NIF. In addition, capitalization
of companies, measured by TCC, is found not to be a determining factor for influential
directors in the financial industry.
Network World publishes annual rankings of “the most powerful people in networking”.
These lists include powerful people in networking and communication technology related
industries. In the IRRC database, these industries correspond to technology and commu-
nication economic groups. To calculate the influence factor and NIF of each director for
the networking industry, we assign zero weight to the companies outside of the technology
and communication economic groups. We then calculate the efficiency coefficient ǫ for each
method and plot Fig. 4.8(e) and Fig. 4.8(f), showing that in the networking industry, lists
made according to TCC match the magazine lists better than lists made according to NIF.
However, the NIF is superior in identifying the powerful directors in networking industry
compared to the centrality measures, such as closeness, betweenness, K-shell, degree and
Bonacich centrality.
In summary, the influence factor measure is superior to degree, betweenness, K-shell
and Bonacich centrality in identifying powerful directors for all cases. Closeness shows
similar efficiency in identifying influential directors as the influence factor measure in the
financial industry. The TCC is as efficient as the influence factor measure when studying
female directors, while TCC is more efficient than the influence factor measure when the
power of directors in the networking industry is analyzed. When considering the criteria
for creating the most powerful people lists, the above results can be explained as follows:
The “100 most powerful people in finance” list is made by interviewing executives, bankers,
economists, technology vendors and consultants, so a director who has a shorter distance
to all the other directors in the network is more likely to be known by the other directors
in the network. The “50 most powerful women in business” list and the “most powerful
people in networking” list emphasize the revenues and profits controlled by the directors and
the importance of their businesses in the global economy. Thus a director who is affiliated
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with large companies would be considered to be more important. Nevertheless, our results
show that regardless of the approach used by magazines to create powerful people lists, our
influence factor measure is always among the most efficient methods in identifying powerful
people from these lists.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the power of directors in the US corporate governance
network. To measure the influence of directors, we develop a new measure, the influence
factor, that offers an objective and quantitative way of determining the power of directors.
In our network, nodes represent directors and the links between two directors exist if the
two directors serve on at least one common corporate board. We build this network of
directors based on the Investor Responsibility Research Center directors database for the
11-year period between 1996 and 2006, and find that the director’s network is comprised of
many fully connected clusters. This network topology presents a challenge for the existing
centrality measures to properly reflect the importance of a director. The influence factor
method is based on an information-sharing process that propagates through the network,
where the amount of information obtained by a director from other directors depends on
the distance between the directors. The longer the distance between two directors is, the
more intermediaries they have between them, hence the higher the information reduction
rate is. In addition, the influence factor is also affected by the market capitalization of
the companies with which directors are affiliated. Thus, the influence factor combines the
topological and non-topological properties of directors in the network. This combination
makes the influence factor more suitable for identifying influential people in the overall
corporate governance network or specific industries compared to other centrality measures
or TCC.
In addition to determining the influence factor, we also evaluate the normalized influence
factor (NIF) of directors for different years and find a scaling relation between the NIF values
which allows us to compare the influence of directors across the years. We then compare the
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efficiency ǫ of the influence factor in identifying powerful people with the efficiencies of other
centrality measures and TCC, using popular magazine lists as benchmarks. Powerful people
lists created by magazines reflect public opinions of directors. Hence they are appropriate
to use as benchmarks when testing how well different measures reflect the influence of a
director.
We find that contrary to commonly accepted belief that directors of large companies
are most powerful, in some instances, influential directors do not serve on boards of large
companies. We also find that the influence factor measure is consistently either the best or
one of the two best methods in identifying the influential people listed in the “50 most pow-
erful women in business” from Fortune, “powerful people in networking” from Networking
World, and “100 most influential people in finance” from Treasury and Risk Management.
In some cases, closeness and TCC are in competition with the influential factor method
when the criteria for creating the most powerful people lists emphasize TCC or closeness.
However the influential factor method is still a better choice to identify the influential di-
rectors overall because of its consistency of performance in all three cases regardless of the
criteria used to create the powerful people lists.
Even though the amount of information that a director can access through the network
may not be the single aspect when determining the influence of the director, the influence
factor measure developed here properly reflects the influence of directors in the US corporate
governance network, and can be a good quantitative and objective measure to identify
influential directors in corporate networks.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of a bipartite network and its “one-mode” projection [93]. Nodes
labeled by numbers correspond to boards, nodes labeled by letters correspond to directors.
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Figure 4.3: (Color online) Demonstration that the cumulative degree distribution function
(P (k)) of the network of directors for 4 typical years 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006 follows expo-
nential distribution P (k) ∝ exp(− kkc ). Note that kc decreases as time evolves (inset graph)
which means that directors tend to sit on fewer boards in more recent compared to earlier
years. The CDF displays a plateau up to a degree of 8 as a consequence of the fact that 8
is the characteristic size of a board for all years studied.
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Figure 4.4: (Color online) Illustration of the distance between directors used when calculat-
ing influence factor(I) of a director. The distance between two directors is defined as the
number of intermediate companies on the shortest path between these two directors. Thus
with respect to director u, director v has a distance 1, director x has a distance 2, etc.
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Figure 4.5: (Color online) Demonstration of cumulative distribution of director’s influence
factor I and NIF I˜ in different years. (a) Cumulative distributions of influence factor I in
different years shows dissimilar behavior. (b) Cumulative distributions of the normalized
influence factor I˜, collapse onto a single curve, which indicates a scaling relation for I˜. The
solid curve corresponds to the complement cumulative function of the Gaussian function
with a mean −0.12 and a standard deviation of 1.22. The scaling relation makes I˜ of
directors in different years comparable.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of overlap of top directors according to influence factor between
different realizaitons v.s. years. For each realization, we calculate the influence factor for
each director and choose the top 100 and 1000 directors out of around 10,000 directors
each year. We find the overlaping percentage of these top directors between each pair of
realizations then find the average and error bar of these overlaping percentages.
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Figure 4.7: (Color online) Comparison between the influence factor I, TCC and the existing
centrality measures for a typical year 1999. Na is the number of companies with which a
director is affiliated. We can see that directors with larger Na tend to be more powerful
by all measures. However, there is always a large overlap between directors with different
Na, which supports our argument that directors who serve on more corporate boards are
not necessarily more powerful than those who serve on fewer boards. Moreover, we find (i)
significant correlation between closeness and influence factor, (ii) some positive correlation
between TCC, Bonacich centrality and influence factor and (iii) a low correlation between
influence factor and degree, K-shell and betweenness. Inset: The relative variance of in-
fluence factor (σ(I)/ < I >) with respect to closeness. Directors are divided into 10 bins
according to their closeness, and variance σ(I) and average < I > for each bin are calcu-
lated to plot this realtive rariance versus closeness graph. Typically the relative variance is
around 14%.
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Figure 4.8: (Color online) Comparison between the efficiency ǫ of the influence factor
measure and other measures in identifying the most influential directors. We apply the
NIF, TCC, closeness, betweenness, K-shell, degree and Bonacich centrality to identify the
influential people listed by magazines. The threshold q is the top fraction of directors
after they have been sorted by descending importance, e.g. q = 0.1 for influence factor
means selecting 10% of the directors with the highest I˜ in our database; p is the fraction
of directors in the magazines’ powerful people lists who are included in the director’s set
selected from the IRRC database by threshold q. The dashed line (p = q, ǫ = 1) is obtained
when directors are randomly selected from the database instead of being ranked. The
ratio ǫ ≡ p/q represents how efficient a measure is in identifying powerful people listed
by magazines from the IRRC directors database. Here we show three cases, “Powerful
Women in Business” from Fortune, “Influential People in Finance” from Treasury and
Risk Management and “Powerful People in Networking” from Network World. In the case
of powerful women in business TCC is as efficient as the influence factor measure, in the
financial industry closeness shows similar efficiency as the influence factor measure, while
in the case of powerful people in networking TCC is more efficient than the influence factor
measure.
Chapter 5
Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs:
Model for Systemic Risk Propagation
5.1 Introduction
There have been dramatic advances in the field of complex networks in recent years [7,
18, 27, 48, 49, 95]. The Internet, airline routes and electric power grids are all examples of
networks in which connectivity between network components is essential.
Because of the strong connectivity, catastrophic cascading failure of nodes in networks
can happen when the system is under a shock, especially if the shocked nodes represent
hubs, or have high centrality measures in the network [6, 34, 39, 63, 96]. So, in order to
minimize the systemic risk, these networks should be designed to be robust to external
shocks. In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, increased attention has been given
to the study of the dynamics of economic systems and to systemic risk in particular. The
widespread impact of the current EU sovereign debt crisis and the 2008 world financial
crisis show that as economic systems become increasingly interconnected, local exogenous
or endogenous shocks can provoke global cascading system failure that is difficult to reverse
and that cripples the system for a prolonged period of time. Thus policy makers are
compelled to create and implement safety measures that can prevent cascading system
failures or soften their systemic impact. Based on the success of complex networks in
modelling interconnected systems, applying complex network theory to study economical
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systems has been under the spot light [9–14].
There are two channels of risk contagion in the banking system, (i) direct interbank
liability linkages between financial institutions and (ii) contagion via changes in bank asset
values. The former, which has been given extensive empirical and theoretical study [97–101],
focuses on the dynamics of loss propagation via the complex network of direct counterpart
exposures following an initial default. The latter, based on bank financial statements and
financial ratio analysis, has received scant attention. A financial shock that contributes to
the bankruptcy of a bank in a complex network will cause the bank to sell its assets. If the
market’s ability to absorb these sales is less than perfect, the market prices of the assets
that the bankrupted bank sells will decrease. Other banks that own similar assets could
also fail because of loss in asset value and increased inability to meet liability obligations.
This imposes further downward pressure on asset values and contributes to further asset
devaluation in the market. Damage in the banking network thus continues to spread, and
the result is a cascading of risk propagation throughout the system [102, 103]. In this paper
we model the risk contagion via changes in asset values in the banking system.
In the past 2008 financial crisis, 371 commercial banks failed between 1/1/2008 and
7/1/2011. The Failed Bank Lists from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FBL-
FDIC) records the names of failed banks and the time when the banks failed. We use this
list as an experimental benchmark to our model. The other dataset that we use is the US
Commercial Banks Balance Sheet Data (CBBSD) from Wharton Research Data Services,
which contains the amounts of assets in each category that the US commercial banks had
on their balance sheets (see Method section for more detail). We use this dataset as an
input to our model.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We first analyse the properties of the
failed banks from FBL-FDIC, examining the weights in specific assets as well as equity to
asset ratios. We then construct a bipartite banking network that is composed of two types
of nodes, (i) banks and (ii) bank assets. Link between a bank and a bank asset exists when
the bank has the asset on its balance sheet. We also develop a cascading failure model
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to simulate the crisis spreading process in the bipartite network. We then populate the
model by the banks’ balance sheet data (CBBSD) for 2007, and run the cascading failure
model by initially introducing a shock to the banking system. We compared the failed banks
identified by model with the actual failed banks from the FBL-FDIC from 2008 to 2011, and
find that our model simulates well the crisis spreading process and identifies a significant
portion of the actual failed banks. Thus, we suggest that our model could be useful to
stress test systemic risk of the banking system. For example, we can test each particular
asset or groups of assets influence on the overall financial system i.e. if the agricultural
assets drop by 20% in value, we can study which banks could be vulnerable to failure, and
offer policy suggestions to prevent such failure, such as requirement to reduce exposure
to agricultural loans or closely monitor the exposed banks. Finally, we show that sharp
transition can occur in the model as parameters change. The bank network can switch
between two distinct regions, stable and unstable, which means that the banking system
can either survive and be healthy or completely collapse. Because it is important that policy
makers keep the world economic system in the stable region, we suggest that our model for
systemic risk propagation might also be applicable to other complex financial systems, e.g.,
to model how sovereign debt value deterioration affects the global banking system or how
the depreciation or appreciation of certain currencies impact the world economy.
5.2 Properties of Failed Banks.
To build a sound banking system network and systemic risk cascading failure model, we
need to study the properties of the failed banks. The asset portfolios of commercial banks
contain such asset categories as commercial loans, residential mortgages, and short and long-
term investments. We model banks according to how they construct their asset portfolios
(upper panel of fig. 5.1). For each bank, the CBBSD contains 13 different non-overlapping
asset categories, e.g., bank i owns amounts Bi,0, Bi,1, ..., Bi,12 of each asset, respectively.
The total asset value Bi and total liability value Li of a bank i are obtained from CBBSD
dataset. The weight of each asset m in the overall asset portfolio of a bank i is then defined
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as wi,m ≡ Bi,m/Bi. From the perspective of the asset categories, we define the total market
value of an asset m as Am ≡
∑
iBi,m. Thus the market share of bank i in asset m is
si,m ≡ Bi,m/Am.
Figure 5.1: Bank-asset bipartite network model with banks as one node type and assets as
the other node type. Link between a bank and an asset exists if the bank has the asset on its
balance sheet. Upper panel: illustration of bank-node and asset-node. Bi,m is the amount
of asset m that bank i owns. Thus, a bank i with total asset value Bi has wi,m fraction of its
total asset value in asset m. si,m is the fraction of asset m that the bank holds out. Lower
panel: illustration of the cascading failure process. The rectangles represent the assets and
the circles represent the banks. From left to right, initially, an asset suffers loss in value
which causes all the related banks’ total assets to shrink. When a bank’s remaining asset
value is below certain threshold (e.g. the bank’s total liability), the bank fails. Failure of
the bank elicits disposal of bank assets which further affects the market value of the assets.
This adversely affects other banks that hold this asset and the total value of their assets
may drop below the threshold which may result in further bank failures. This cascading
failure process propagates back and forth between banks and assets until no more banks
fail.
To study the properties of failed banks between 2008 and 2011, we focus on the weight
of each bank’s assets. For certain assets, we find that the asset weight distributions for all
banks differ from the asset weight distributions for failed banks. Figures 5.2(a) and 5.2(c)
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show that, unlike survived banks, failed banks cluster in a region heavily weighted with
construction and development loans and loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties.
Failed banks have less agricultural loans in their asset portfolios compared to survived
banks (fig. 5.2(d)). These results confirm the nature of the most recent financial crisis of
2007–2011 in which bank failures were largely caused by real estate-based loans, including
loans for construction and land development and loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential
properties [104]. In this kind of financial crisis, banks with greater agricultural loan assets
are more financially robust [105]. Figure 5.2(e) shows that failed banks tend to have lower
equity to asset ratios, i.e. failed banks generally had higher leverage ratios than survived
banks during the financial crisis of 2008-2011 [106].
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of probability density functions (PDF) of weight of typical assets
and equity ratios between all banks and FDIC listed failed banks for 2007. (a) PDF of the
weight of loans for construction and land development in banks’ total asset. (b) PDF of the
weight of loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties in banks’ total assets. (c) PDF
of the weight of loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties in banks’ total assets.
(d) PDF of the weight of agriculture loans in banks’ total assets. (e) PDF of banks’ equity
to asset ratios. Blue circles curves represents PDFs of all banks, red triangles represents
PDFs of those banks that are on the FDIC failed bank list.
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5.3 Cascading Failure Propagation Model.
To study the systemic risk of the banking system as complex networks, we construct a
cascading failure model based on the facts presented in the previous section.
We first build a bipartite network which contains two types of nodes, banks on one
hand and bank assets on the other. Link exists between a bank and an asset when the
bank has the asset on its balance sheet. No links between banks or between assets exist.
To simulate the cascading failure process, we develop and apply the following model with
three parameters p, η and α (illustrated in fig. 5.1):
1. We initially shock certain asset m, reducing the Total Market Value of asset m to
p fraction of its original value, p ∈ [0, 1]. The smaller the p is, the larger the shock.
When p is 0, the total market value of asset m is wiped out. When p is 1, no shock
is imposed.
2. When the market deteriorates, each bank i that owns the shocked asset m will expe-
rience Bi,m(1− p) reduction in value, where Bi,m is the amount of asset m that is on
bank i’s balance sheet.
3. When the total asset value of a bank declines to a level below the level of promised
payments on the debt, it causes distress or default. The total asset value that triggers
an incidence of distress lies somewhere between the book value of total liabilities and
short-term liabilities. In the corporate sector default analysis, Moody’s Analytics
used the sum of short-term debt, interest payments and half of long-term debt [107–
109] as the distress barrier. However, in the past financial crisis, external aid from
other financial institutes or from the government played a significant role in distorting
this distress barrier, thus even when a bank’s total value of assets was below its
liabilities, the bank could still survive. We describe these combined effects using
random number r that is uniformly distributed in range [0, η], where η ∈ [0, 0.5] is a
parameter controlling tolerance of a bank’s assets being below its liabilities. We define
the distress barrier to be (1− r) ·Li, such that a bank fails when Bi < (1− r) ·Li. For
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such distress barrier with evolving randomness, the probability P(Bi, Li) for a bank i
to fail can be written as
P (Bi, Li) =


0 if Bi ≥ Li
(Li −Bi)/(ηLi) if η 6= 0, Li > Bi > (1− η)Li
1 if (1− η)Li > Bi
(5.1)
4. We assume that when a bank i fails, the overall market value of each asset m that the
failed bank owns suffers αBi,m value deduction, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a third parameter
in the model that describes the market’s reaction to a bank failure. The unit price
of asset m becomes
Am−αBi,m
Am
of its original price. That is because the failed banks
need to sell assets to meet their liabilities and the market’s ability to absorb this sale
is not perfect, which leads to price decrease of the affected assets. The loss of the
market value of each asset m is proportional to Bi,m, the amount of asset m that the
failed bank i owns. Depending on the liquidity of an asset, α can be between 0 and 1.
When an asset is extremely liquid, the market value of the asset will not be adversely
affected by asset sales, α = 0. When the market is extremely illiquid, then the value
of asset could potentially have zero value. Thus the aggregated total market value of
asset Am will be reduced to Am −Bi,m, which corresponds to α = 1.
5. Further deterioration of asset values can then contribute to failure of more banks.
Thus the damage in the bipartite network spreads between banks and assets bidirec-
tionally until the cascading failure stops.
Usually financial crises start with a burst of economic bubbles. The correspondence
of the model’s initial shock parameter p in reality can be described as the drop of certain
asset value at the beginning of a crisis. For example, when the dot-com bubble burst, the
technology heavy NASDAQ Composite index lost 66% percents of its value, plunging from
the peak of 5048 in March 10, 2000 to the 1720 in April 2, 2001.
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5.4 Empirical Test and Analysis.
To empirically test our model, we introduce a shock into the banking system by reducing
(1 − p) percentage of the value of a single asset m. We then monitor the progression of
bank failure until the cascading process stops. We examine two distinct groups of banks
1) all the analyzed banks from CBBSD dataset, and 2) the banks from the FDL-FDIC
failed bank list. We then study the fraction of banks that were identified as survived by our
model in both groups. We plot both of these fractions versus the sizes of initial shocks in
fig. 5.3, for parameter η = 0. The four plots correspond to four typical assets being initially
shocked respectively. Figure 5.3(a) and figure 5.3(c) show that when the commercial real
estate loans, i.e. loans for construction and land development and loans secured by nonfarm
nonresidential properties, suffer initial shock respectively, the survival rate of the banks from
the first group (all banks), according to our model, is distinctly above the survival rate of
the second group of banks (FBL-FDIC failed banks list). This illustrates that when the
commercial real estate loans are initially shocked, the model can identify the actual failed
banks efficiently. Figures 5.3(b) and 5.3(d) show that when we impose initial shock on loans
secured by 1-4 family residual properties or agricultural loans, the model does not clearly
separate the two groups of banks. This result indicates that the commercial bank failures
during the 2008 financial crisis stems from value deterioration of commercial real estate
loans.
To quantitatively test the efficiency of the model in identifying failed banks, we use
the receiver-operating-characteristic (ROC) curve analysis, which plots the fraction of true
positives out of the positives and the fraction of false positive out of the negatives for a
binary classifier system. ROC curve analysis is a standard method in signal detection theory
as well as in psychology, medicine and biometrics [110]. We choose a parameter combination
of p, η and α to run the model to determine which banks fail, and compare this prediction
with the FDIC list of failed banks. The true positive rate is defined as the fraction of the
actual failed banks that are also identified as failed in our model. The false positive rate is
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Figure 5.3: Fraction of survived banks after cascading failures as function of the initial loss
of value of certain asset, with η = 0. Blue dashed lines represent the fraction of survived
banks out of all banks, and the red solid lines represent the fraction of survived banks out
of the 278 failed banks from FDIC failed bank list. The parameter α is changed from 0
to 0.1 by 0.01 to produce 10 lines for each case. (a) Initial shock is imposed to loans for
construction and land development. The red solid lines are significantly lower than the
blue dashed lines separating clearly the failed banks from the set of all banks. (b) Initial
shock is imposed to loans secured by 1-4 family resid. properties. The red solid lines and
blue dashed lines are entangled. (c) Initial shock on loans secured by nonfarm nonresid.
properties. The red solid lines are distinguishably lower than the blue dashed lines, similarly
as in the case under (a). (d) Initial shock on agricultural loans. The red solid lines are
slightly higher than the blue dashed line, not showing clear distinction between failed and
non failed banks.
the fraction of banks that are not on the FDIC list of failed banks but are identified as failing
by our model. Each point in the ROC curve corresponds to one parameter combination. A
complete random guess would give points along the diagonal line from the left bottom to
the top right corner. The more a point is above the diagonal line, the stronger predictive
power the model has.
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We firstly impose the initial shock to the construction and land development loans and
plot the ROC curves in the top row of fig. 5.4. As fig. 5.4(a) shows, when the false-positive
rate is below 0.2 we have a relatively high true-positive to false-positive ratio. For example,
the four black dots in fig. 5.4(a) represent the false-positive rate and true positive rate
pairs (0.06, 0.5), (0.1, 0.61), (0.15, 0.72) and (0.2, 0.78) respectively. The pair (0.06, 0.5)
corresponds to the parameter combination (α, η, p) = (0.14, 0.26, 0.6), which means using
this parameter combination, the model can identify 50% of the actual failed banks that
are on the FBL-FDIC with cost of 6% false positive prediction. Overall, the ROC curve is
bended well above the diagonal curve, which means the model captures a significant portion
of the real-world behavior and has predictive power.
However, fig. 5.4(a) alone is not enough to justify our complex networks model as nec-
essary model to describe the systemic risk in this banking system. If all of the actual failed
banks owned a large amount of loans for construction and land development, then these
banks will fail in the model in the first round of failure after this type of asset is initially
shocked. In that case, we only need to look at the weight of this asset in the banks’ portfolio
to identify the failed banks. However, we find that the failure of banks does not only occur
because of the initial shock to specific assets, but also because of the amplified damage by
positive feed back in the complex banking network. The interdependency between banks
and the complexity of network structure are crucial to this amplified damage in the system.
To demonstrate our findings we conduct separately ROC curve analysis for the first-step
prediction (bank failures caused directly by the initial shock on an asset) as well as for the
consecutive-steps prediction (bank failures caused by a cascading failure process) as shown
in figs. 5.4(b) and 5.4(c). We find that in addition to the first-step effective predictions,
the consecutive-steps of the model further efficiently identify failed banks that can not be
identified by the first-step (ROC curve is above the diagonal line). Fig. 5.4(d) further shows
the number of failed banks correctly identified through the first and consecutive steps of the
cascading failure simulation for the four parameter combinations selected from fig. 5.4(a)
(black dots in the figures). In all four cases, the number of failed banks predicted by
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(a) Prediction by the entire cascading
failure process.
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(b) Prediction by the first cascading
failure step.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
False Positive
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
(c) Prediction by steps other than the
first step.
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(d) Number of failed banks identified
through different stages of cascading
failure.
Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties
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(e) Prediction by the entire cascading
failure process.
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(f) Prediction by the first cascading fail-
ure step.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
False Positive
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
(g) Prediction by steps other than the
first step.
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Figure 5.4: ROC curves of the prediction of failed banks by our cascading failure model
when the loans for construction and land development are initially shocked (top figures) and
when the loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties are initially shocked (bottom
figures), based on 2007 data. Each point of the ROC curves corresponds to one combina-
tion of parameters (α, η, p). (a)(e) ROC curve of predictions made by the entire cascading
failure process, (b)(f) of predictions made by the first cascading failure step and (c)(g) of
predictions made by the other than the first cascading steps. The color of a dot represents
the number of failed banks correctly identified by the model with the corresponding param-
eters combination. (d)(h) For fixed false positive rates of 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%, we find
parameter combinations with maximum true positive rates in fig. (a), and show the number
of failed banks identified by the first step (red) and the number of failed banks identified by
the other steps in the cascading failure process (white). The black dots in (a)(b)(c) show
the positions of four combinations respectively.
the consecutive steps represents a significant fraction of the total number of failed banks
identified. This result shows that some banks did fail only because of the the complex
interconnections between banks in the system, which contributes to the risk contagion in
the system. Thus, our model captures the complexity feature of the banking system and
can offer prediction better than predictions made only based on balance sheet but without
considering interactions between banks.
In addition to construction and land development loans, we also test our cascading
failure model by simulating initial shock on other assets. The ROC curves in the bottom
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row of fig. 5.4 show that the loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties, when
initially shocked, have lower predictive power (smaller true-positive to false-positive ratio)
compared to the case when initial shock is imposed on loans for construction and land
development. ROC curve tests for assets of loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties
and agricultural loans, as shown in figs. 5.5(a) and 5.5(b), exhibit curves that are almost
diagonal, indicating that initial shocks on these two assets have no predictive power on the
failure of the banks in the 2007–2011 financial crisis. A truly random behavior would render
points along the diagonal line (the so-called line of no discrimination) from the bottom left
to the top right corners.
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Figure 5.5: ROC curves of predictions of failed banks by our cascading failure model when
(a) loans secured by 1-4 family resid. properties and (b) agricultural loans are initially
shocked respectively. The straighter the ROC curve is, the closer it is to random case,
meaning the less predictive power in regard to the failure of the commercial banks during
the 2007-2011 financial crisis.
The above ROC curve results suggest that the construction and land development loans
and the loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties were the two asset types most
relevant in the failure of commercial banks during the 2007–2011 financial crisis. It is largely
believed that the past financial crisis is caused by residential real estate assets. However, we
do not find evidence that loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties are responsible
for commercial banks failures. This result is consistent with the conclusion of ref. [104]
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that the cause of the commercial banks failure between 2007-2011 were largely caused by
commercial real estate-based loans rather than residential mortgages.
Our final exploration is of the percolation-like property exhibited by the bank-asset
bipartite network. Complex networks usually exhibit percolation phase transitions. As the
dependent parameter changes, the giant component of connected clusters in the network can
drop to zero at the critical point. In the bank-asset bipartite network model we go beyond
the giant component of connected clusters and study all survived banks. Thus, percolation
theory can not be applied. However, we find that a percolation-like phenomenon also
exists in this model. We study the number of survived banks after the cascading failure
process, tuning one parameter and keeping the other two parameters fixed. We find that
the number of survived nodes in networks can change dramatically with a small change
of parameters. The parameter combination is chosen as the first example in figure 5.4(d),
α = 0.14, η = 0.26, and p = 0.6. We show that the fraction of surviving banks changes
smoothly as parameters p and η change (see figs. 5.6(a) and 5.6(c)). But as α changes,
the fraction of surviving banks changes abruptly at a critical point and displays a first-
order-like abrupt phase transition (fig. 5.6(b)). We show that the first-order-like phase
transition also exists for p and η for a certain parameter combination pool. As an example,
we choose another parameter combination (α = 0.35, η = 0.2, and p = 0.6). We show in the
right panel of fig. 5.6 that a first-order-like phase transition exists for all three parameters,
which means the system is at risk of abrupt collapse. Figure 5.6(d) shows that, when the
initial shock parameter p for an asset is below a certain threshold, even if the other asset
market values are undamaged, almost all banks default because the cascading failure of
this single asset (construction and land development loans) significantly affects the overall
financial system. Figure 5.6(e) shows that when the effect of bank failures on asset market
values is sufficiently large, the whole banking system is at risk of collapse. Figure 5.6(f)
shows that when η is large, i.e., when the bank distress barrier of default is more relaxed,
the robustness of the system improves significantly. Thus, the bank-asset bipartite network
behaves differently for different parameter combinations. Figure 5.7 plots the phase diagram
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for this bank network. Two different regions exist for parameters p and α. In region I, the
bank network system is in a stable state, i.e., after cascading failure a significant number
of banks will still survive. In region II, the cascading failure process contributes to the
collapse of the entire bank network. Given that the bank network as a complex system
exhibits these two distinct states, it is extremely important that policy makers institute
rules that will keep the banking system in the stable region.
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Figure 5.6: Survival rate of banks when asset 0 ( loans for construction and land devel-
opment ) is initially shocked as function of one parameter with the other two parameters
fixed. Average over 300 independent realizations with 95% confidence interval. Left panel:
parameter combination α = 0.14, η = 0.26 and p = 0.6; right panel: parameter combination
α = 0.35, η = 0.2 and p = 0.6.
5.5 Discussion
In this paper, we develop a bipartite network model for systemic risk propagation and
specifically study the cascading failure process in the banking system. We first study the
properties of the defaulting banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and find that they
differ from the properties of the survived banks. We then construct a bipartite banking
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Figure 5.7: Phase diagram for parameter α and p, when η = 0.26. The network is stable in
region I. Significant part of banks in the network would still survive after cascading failure.
In region II, almost all the banks in the network fail after cascading failure.
network that is composed of (i) banks on one hand and (ii) bank assets on the other. We
also propose a cascading failure model to simulate the crisis spreading process in banking
networks. We introduce a shock into the banking system by reducing a specific asset value
and we monitor the cascading effect of this value reduction on banks and on other asset
values. We test our model using 2007 balance sheet data by identifying the empirically
failed banks between 2008 and 2011, and find through ROC curve analysis that our model
simulates well the crisis spreading process and identifies a significant portion of the actual
failed banks from the FDIC failed bank database.
Furthermore, studying the cascading failure of banks step by step shows that the complex
structure of the bank network indeed contributes to the spreading of financial crisis, which
makes a complex network model necessary in describing and predicting the behavior of the
banking system. Thus, we suggest that our model could be useful to stress test systemic
risk of the banking system. For example, we can stress test the model to predict which
banks could be in danger and how many banks could fail if the agricultural assets drop
72
20% in value. We then offer policy suggestions such as requirement to reduce exposure
to agricultural loans or closely monitor vulnerable banks. Then the model also indicates
possible ways to mitigate the propagation of financial crisis. From the model we know that
risk in the banking system propagates bidirectionally between assets and banks. Suppressing
propagation either way could be very helpful to mitigating such catastrophes. The first way
is to provide liquidity to the market, thus when distressed banks need to sell assets, the
market will not overreact. The second way to curb systemic risk contagion is to ensure that
banks are solvent and have healthy balance sheets, i.e. no excess leverage, higher capital
requirements, appropriate levels of liquid assets, etc. in order to be able to absorb shocks to
the asset value. Possible measures could be to pay a periodic fee to a supervising institution
during non-crisis periods in exchange for obtaining emergency liquidity, as proposed by
Perotti et al. [111].
Lastly, we show that as the parameters of the system change the bank network can
switch between two distinct regions, stable and unstable, which are separated by a so-called
phase transition boundary. We suggest that the bank network be understood in complex
system terms and that its closeness to the phase transition boundary be diligently monitored
in order to forestall system failure.
We suggest that our model for systemic risk propagation might be applicable to other
complex systems, e.g., to study the effect of sovereign debt value deterioration on the global
banking system or to analyze the impact of depreciation or appreciation of certain currencies
on the world economy.
After this work was completed, we learned of the independent work of Caccioli et
al. [112], also addressing the challenges of systemic risk due to overlapping portfolios. Their
independent results are complementary to ours.
5.6 Methods
Data Sets And Explanations. We use two data sets in this paper. The first is the Com-
mercial Banks - Balance Sheet Data (CBBSD) from Wharton Research Data Services [113]
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for the time period 1/1/1976 to 12/31/2008, which contains the amounts of 13 specific
assets and the total assets, total liabilities, and total equities for each bank. We enumerate
the assets from 0 to 12 to simplify the problem and categorize the assets into real estate
loans, other loans, and other assets. These assets are listed in Table 5.1. We study the
data for the year 2007, which contains 7,846 US banks. All banks have total assets data,
but 21,171 data spots out of the total 7, 846 × 13 = 101, 998 data spots for specific assets
are blank. For banks with complete data, it is confirmed that the total asset value equals
the sum of individual asset. The absent data causes the sum of the individual assets to be
lower than the total assets. Furthermore, in some cases, the sum of the individual assets
can be smaller than the bank’s total liabilities, which leads the banks to fail before any
shock is introduced in the model. Thus we need to ensure that the sum of the individual
asset values is equal to the total assets value, by allocating the difference between the total
asset and available individual assets to the missing assets. If a bank has more than one
missing asset, the distribution of the difference to the assets is proportional to the average
amount of these assets on the balance sheets of other banks.
The step-by-step methodology is described as follows:
1. For each bank i, we calculate the weight wi,m =
Bim
Bi
of assetm in the bank’s portfolio.
2. We then calculate the average weight of each asset 〈w〉m =
∑
i wi,m
N , where N is the
total number of banks.
3. From the total asset and known specific assets, we calculate the total amount for the
unknown assets, which is (Bi −
∑
known assets Bi,m). We then distribute this total
amount to each unknown asset by their average weight (〈w〉m)ratios. For example,
if a bank i lacks data on asset x and asset y, the amount of asset x is calculated as
Bi,x = (Bi −
∑
m6=x, yBi,m)
〈w〉x∑
m=x,y〈w〉m
.
The second dataset that we use is the Failed Bank List from the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FBL-FDIC) [114], which shows that 371 banks failed during the 1/1/2008
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– 7/1/2011 period and that only 27 banks failed during the 2000–2007 period. We use this
representative dataset to empirically test our model for the 2008 financial crisis. Of the
371 banks in the FBL-FDIC dataset, 278 banks are included in the Commercial Banks -
Balance Sheet Data dataset in 2007.
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index Balance Sheet Asset Variables Rows 〈w〉m
Real Estate Loans
0 Loans for construction and land development 6139 0.082
1 Loans secured by farmland 5932 0.038
2 Loans secured by 1-4 family residential proper-
ties
7553 0.167
3 Loans secured by multifamily (>5) residential
properties
5381 0.013
4 Loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential prop-
erties.
7495 0.150
Other Loans
5 Agricultural loans 5167 0.041
6 Commercial and industrial loans 3117 0.031
7 Loans to individuals 7504 0.097
8 All other loans 7049 0.171
9 Obligations (other than securities and leases) of
states and political subdivision in the U.S.
7559 0.046
Other Assets
10 Held-to-maturity securities 5924 0.003
11 Available-for-sale securities, total 3445 0.004
12 Premises and fixed assets including capitalized
lease
7751 0.020
Table 5.1: Description of Commercial Banks - Balance Sheet Data (CBBSD) from Wharton
Research Data Services. The third column represents the number of available rows of data
of each asset for the year 2007 before completion. The total number of banks in 2007 in the
CBBSD is 7846. 〈w〉m is the average asset weight of banks.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis covers my research on the complex networks field during the past 5 years,
including theoretical development of interdependent networks models and application of
complex networks models to study economical systems.
In the modern society, our infrastructure systems are more and more coupled. Failure
in one system will be non-linearly spread into other systems and cause dramatic cost to the
whole society. To design such large robust interdependent systems or to protect the exist-
ing interdependent systems has become more and more difficult. Interdependent networks
research offers deep insight to these issues. In the second chapter, we study the robustness
of interdependent networks under targeted attack on specific degree nodes. We introduce
a method and show that targeted-attack problems in networks can be mapped to random-
attack problems by transforming the networks which are under initial attack. It provides a
routine method (if the random-attack case is solvable) to study the targeted-attack problems
in both single networks and randomly connected and uncorrelated interdependent networks,
i.e. (i) the case of three or more interdependent networks, (ii) the case of partially coupled
interdependent networks, (iii) the case in which a node from network A can depend on more
than one node from network B. By applying the method, we find that in contrast to single
networks, when the highly connected nodes are defended, the percolation threshold pc has a
finite non-zero value which is significantly larger than zero. For example, when the degrees
of all nodes are known and nodes can only be damaged from lower degree to high degree,
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pc ≈ 0.46 for coupled SF networks with λ = 2.8 and 〈k〉 = 4 while pc for the same single SF
network is 0. The implications of the study are dramatic. It indicates that current meth-
ods applied to design robust networks and improve the robustness of current networks, i.e.
protecting the high degree nodes, need to be modified to apply to interdependent network
systems. Then in the third chapter, we study how clustering influences the robustness of
interdependent networks. Since usually degree-degree correlation is inevitable when clus-
tering is brought into network, we also derive an analytical expression,for degree-degree
correlation as a function of the clustering coefficient. Such that we can study the influence
of clustering alone on the robustness of interdependent networks. We conclude that pc for
interdependent networks increases when networks are more highly clustered. This occurs
because clustered networks contain some links in triangles that do not contribute to the
giant component, and in each stage of cascading failure the giant component will be smaller
than in the unclustered case.
Complex networks models are widely studied because they offer tools to describe the
complex systems in our reality. One group of the systems that can be successfully described
by networks are the economical systems. The relationship developed between people and
institutions during business practice naturally form a network, which can serve for the good,
i.e. transfer information and influence, or serve for the bad, i.e. spread of crisis. In this
thesis, we apply the complex networks model to describe two economical systems: i)board of
directors’ network; and ii)commercial bank network. In chapter 4, we analyze the power of
directors in the US corporate governance network through complex networks methodology.
To measure the influence of directors, we develop a influence factor measure, which offers an
objective and quantitative way of describing how information and influence are transferred
through the network, which enables us to determine the power of directors. Tested by
influential people lists of popular magazines, we find that the influence factor measure is
consistently either the best or one of the two best methods in identifying influential people.
We find that contrary to commonly accepted belief that directors of large companies are
most powerful, in some instances, influential directors do not serve on boards of large
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companies. In chapter 5, we develop a bipartite network model for systemic risk propagation
and specifically study the cascading failure process in the banking system. We first study
the properties of the defaulting banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and find that
they differ from the properties of the survived banks. We then construct a bipartite banking
network that is composed of (i) banks on one hand and (ii) bank assets on the other. We
also propose a cascading failure model to simulate the crisis spreading process in banking
networks. We introduce a shock into the banking system by reducing a specific asset value
and we monitor the cascading effect of this value reduction on banks and on other asset
values. We test our model using 2007 balance sheet data by identifying the empirically
failed banks between 2008 and 2011, and find through ROC curve analysis that our model
simulates well the crisis spreading process and identifies a significant portion of the actual
failed banks from the FDIC failed bank database. We show that as the parameters of
the model change the bank network can switch between two distinct regions, stable and
unstable, which are separated by a so-called phase transition boundary. We suggest that
our model for systemic risk propagation might be applicable to other complex systems, e.g.,
to study the effect of sovereign debt value deterioration on the global banking system or
to analyze the impact of depreciation or appreciation of certain currencies on the world
economy.
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